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Abstract 
In this master’s thesis the market value of diversified firms has been compared to the 
value of single-segment firms, in order to find out how different types of 
diversification affect firm value. The impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the 
valuation of  diversified firms has also been investigated and discussed. The empirical 
results point out that, between 1997 and 2012, industrially diversified firms have been 
trading at a premium of 22.5% compared to focused firms, while globally diversified 
firms have not. The combination of industrial and global diversification has been 
found to yield an additional premium of 9.2%. This positive effect is even stronger for 
firms that diversified into unrelated industries after the crisis. It has also been 
discovered that the premium for industrial diversification increases with the number 
of segments a firm reports to be operating in. 
The empirical findings have also been interpreted from an accounting perspective. It 
has been discussed how earnings management can explain the existence of a 
diversification discount, especially for cross-border diversification. It has also been 
illustrated how diversified firms have a greater propensity towards expansion through 
acquisition and how this could help explaining the discount found by studies using 
Tobin’s q as a measurement for comparing firm value. 
The different theories explaining the international business related background of 
corporate diversification have also been presented and discussed, from Coase’s 
market imperfection theory to Buckley and Casson’s internationalisation theory and 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm. The relation  
between diversification and market entry mode has been described and it has been 
emphasised how the different combinations of diversification strategies and host-
country entry modes are significant for a firm’s internationalisation approach. 
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1. Introduction 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have become a very important player in 
today’s economy and a thoroughly studied phenomenon, as they numerically account 
for about half of the firms in the United States.
1
 A MNC is defined as “an organization 
that owns and operates affiliated subsidiaries in one or more foreign countries. 
Establishment of overseas subsidiaries is achieved through foreign direct investment 
(FDI)”.2 
Multi-segment firms (i.e. those that operate in different industries or sectors) are 
also very common, although less-frequent than multinationals. 17.8% of US-based 
companies reported to be operating in more than one business sector between 1984 and 
1997, and 18.6% between 1997 and 2012.
3
 Several studies, carried out during the 1990s, 
suggested that these companies trade at a discount compared to stand-alone firms in the 
same industries.
4
 The discount was commonly associated to agency problems and to the 
cross-subsidisation of weaker units by stronger units, which resulted in the inefficient 
allocation of valuable resources.
5
 
Later studies, however, found that these results might have been caused by 
methodological weaknesses such as sample selection bias or due to the endogeneity of a 
firm’s diversification decision. Some authors even claimed that the discount is only an 
artefact of the data employed for the analysis.
6
 
Another weakness of these studies was that they analysed industrial 
diversification only, and therefore did not consider the effects of global diversification, 
which is much more significant and common. Firms that diversify globally also very 
often diversify industrially. This strong observed correlation between industrial and 
                                                 
 
1
 See Table IV on page 10 for the precise figures. 
2
 Some authors prefer to define a MNCs as a firm that produces in at least five different countries instead 
of only one. The present thesis instead will use the definition by Akoorie/Scott-Kennel (2005), p.100, 
which is quoted above. The terms global, geographic and cross-border diversification are used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis to describe MNCs and should be considered as synonyms. The 
term industrial diversification is used for multisegment/multibusiness firms. FDI is defined by the 
IMF to describe “an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which a foreign investor owns 10 
per cent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power of an incorporated enterprise or the 
equivalent of an unincorporated enterprise.” Source: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bop/ 
pdf/diteg20.pdf 
3
 See Denis/Denis/Yost (2002), p. 1958 for the first statistic and Table IV on page 10 for the second. 
4
 For example, see the results of Lang/Stulz (1994) pp. 1278 and Berger/Ofek (1995) pp. 59-60. 
5
 See Erdorf et al. (2011) pp. 4-5.  
6
 Villalonga (2004) used a different dataset than previous studies and found a diversification premium. 
Campa/Kedia (2002) found that, by controlling for endogeneity, evidence in favour of a 
diversification discount is significantly reduced, and in some cases even a premium can be found. 
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global diversification could have introduced an omitted variable bias in studies that did 
not control for this type of diversification.
7
  
Bodnar/Tang/Weintrop (1999) were the first to take into account the effect of 
geographic diversification on firm value and to argue that previous studies were flawed 
by omitted variable bias. The empirical results of their research suggest that, while 
industrial diversification does indeed create a value loss, geographic diversification 
yields a premium.
8
 
More recent studies found that during the 2008 financial crisis, industrially 
diversified firms increased in value compared to single-segment firms. Most likely 
because they are perceived by investors as a safer option compared to focused firms.
9
 
These studies however did not verify how the financial crisis affected the valuation of 
different types of diversification, i.e. distinguishing between industrial, global and 
related/unrelated diversification. Previous studies that compared the valuation effects of 
different types of diversification were carried out using pre-2008 data; today the 
scenario might be quite different. 
Kuppuswamy/Villalonga (2010) found that the risk-perception of investors may 
have changed after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the beginning of the most-
recent financial and economic crisis. They found that the diversification discount 
disappeared after 1997.
10
 It is therefore necessary to examine if the financial crisis’ 
impact on the valuation of global diversification was different to its effect on industrial 
diversification. It also needs to be measured if unrelated diversification, which generates 
non-perfectly correlated cash flow streams, is more highly valued than related 
diversification during the crisis. 
The aim of this master’s thesis is to compare the market value of diversified firms 
to the value of single-segment firms, and to find out how different types of 
diversification affect firm value. The empirical analysis differentiates between 
industrially and globally diversified firms and takes into account if the diversification is 
                                                 
 
7
 See Denis/Denis/Yost (2002), p. 1963 and Table VIII and Table IX of the present thesis. 
8
 Some researchers argue that the term “global” should be used instead of “geographic”, as the latter 
could also be referred to diversification across regions of the same country. However, since these term 
as used interchangeably in most studies, they are considered as synonyms in the present writing and 
have been used accordingly. Cf. Denis/Denis/Yost (2002), p. 1957.  
9
 Cf. Kuppuswamy/Villalonga (2010) p. 3. 
10
 See Kuppuswamy/Villalonga (2010), p.36. 
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related or unrelated. The impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the valuation of 
diversified firms has also been investigated and discussed.
11
 
The research question of the thesis is: “what are the effects of corporate 
diversification on firm value and to what extent does the impact of global diversification 
differ from that of industrial diversification? Has the recent financial crisis affected this 
valuation in the United States?” 
In order to add a strategic and a practical interpretation, the empirical findings 
have also been discussed from an accounting and international business (IB) perspective 
in chapters 8 and 9. The remaining part of the thesis is divided as follows: the literature 
review of chapter 2 offers an in-depth introduction to the topic of corporate 
diversification and to the empirical results of the most important research of the past 
years. It is explained why corporate diversification is still a very controversial topic and 
why the financial crisis might have affected the way multibusiness and multinational 
companies are perceived by investors. 
The methodological aspects of the thesis are explained in chapter 3, whereas 
chapter 4 outlines which data has been used and how it has been processed. The 
empirical results are presented and discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 7: Chapter 10 provides 
a summary of the findings and adds some concluding remarks. 
2. Literature review on corporate diversification 
This chapter introduces the topic of corporate diversification, from the early 
studies carried out in the 1990s to the present day. The section is divided into four 
paragraphs: the first will introduce the topic of diversification and the results of early 
studies; the second presents the later research that criticised the methodologies and 
results of the earlier studies; the third paragraph focuses on the differences between 
industrial and global diversification; the fourth paragraph explains how the 2008 
financial crisis might have had an impact on corporate diversification and why today 
this is a relevant research topic. 
                                                 
 
11
 Different names can be found to define the financial and economic crisis that originated from the US 
sub-prime mortgage crisis and affected the global financial markets and economy. In the present thesis, 
for simplicity, it will be referred to as “the 2008 financial crisis”. 
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2.1. Definition of corporate diversification and studies of the 1990s 
Corporate diversification is defined as a “strategy that takes the organisation 
away from both its existing markets and its existing products [...], increasing the 
organisation’s scope”.12  Several reasons have been provided by past researchers in 
order to justify the existence of diversified firms. The three most frequent ones are the 
market-power view, the resource-view and the agency view. The first describes that 
firms increase in size (both horizontally and vertically) to extend their power over 
competitors. Thereby, they are gaining a competitive advantage, such as being able to 
offer products at predatory prices through cross-subsidisation of firm-segments. The 
second view states that, in response to excess capacity in productive resources, firms 
will tend to expand in order to make use of their overcapacity. Some capabilities can 
therefore be shared across segments, thus reducing costs through economies of scope 
and gaining competitive advantage. The third view is based on agency theory and 
explains diversification trough managers’ self-interest and power-seeking strategies.13 
Despite the large number of diversified firms in the United States, several studies 
of the early 1990s found that corporate diversification might actually not be beneficial 
for investors as it destroys firm value. Kaplan/Weisbach (1992) find that almost 44% of 
large companies acquired during the 1970s and the early 1980s where sold within a few 
years. Despite most divestures being profitable, the resale of unrelated segments was 
three times more likely than the resale of related segments. The profitability of the 
divested segments usually grew significantly under the new acquirer.
14
 
 Lang and Stulz (1994) were among the first to compare the value of diversified 
and non-diversified firms. They constructed a portfolio of non-diversified firms and 
used it to compare its value with that of diversifying firms, discovering the existence of 
a significant conglomerate discount between diversified and focused firms.
15
 
The finding of a diversification discount seemed counterintuitive at first, since 
perfect-market assumptions suggest that firm diversification should be irrelevant for the 
reduction of unsystematic risk. According to capital market theory, firms will internalise 
activities only if that is more efficient than leaving the interactions to the open market. 
                                                 
 
12
 See Johnson/Scholes/Whittington (2010), p. 262. 
13
 See Montgomery (1994), pp. 164-167 and Furrer (2010), pp. 46-47. 
14
 Related segments are defined as those that operate in the same industry as the parent company. See 
Kaplan/Weisbach (1992), pp. 136-137. 
15
 See Lang/Stulz (1994), p. 1278. 
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However, empirical findings on firm data from the 1960 to the 1990s suggest that this is 
not the case, as very often multi-segment firms trade at a significant discount compared 
to their focused counterparts, even when controlling for firm size and profitability.
16
 
Agency theory has often been used to explain why firms diversify even though 
this causes a value reduction. The most common problems incurred by conglomerates 
are explained by the theories of risk reduction, empire-building and entrenchment, 
which are phenomena that very often can be observed in the same firm. Risk-reducing 
diversification occurs because managers want to decrease the overall insolvency risk by 
diversifying into several unrelated industries. If the firm earns uncorrelated cash-flow-
streams, it will also be less likely to go bankrupt, which reduces managers’ individual 
employment risk. It has also been found that firms with greater owner concentration 
display lower degrees of value-destroying diversification as managers’ possibilities for 
risk-reducing investments are limited by the stronger owner groups.
17
 
Empire-building stands for the tendency of managers to increase their power, 
compensation and bonuses through unnecessary firm growth. This is closely related to 
entrenchment, which takes place when managers overinvest to increase the firm’s 
complexity and the number of different operations, thereby making themselves more 
difficult to substitute.
18
 This can be achieved by investing in businesses related to their 
own background experience or by making as many contracts as possible implicit instead 
of explicit. Entrenchment makes it costlier for shareholders to replace the manager, who 
can therefore demand a higher compensation or greater power.
19
 Inefficient investment 
has been found to be greater for firms that have more borrowing power or large free 
cash flows. These are thus more likely to undertake inefficient diversification 
investments that will generate lower gains.
20
 
The results of Lang/Stulz (1994) have been confirmed by several other studies. 
Berger and Ofek (1995) also find the existence of a conglomerate discount, which 
ranges between 13% and 15%. They argue that cross-subsidisation of weaker units by 
stronger units and overinvestment in industries with low opportunities (two typical 
characteristics of multi-segment firms) are the main factors that underlie their results. 
                                                 
 
16
 Cf. Erdorf et al. (2011), p. 3 and Coase (1937). 
17
 See Villalonga (2003), pp. 1-2. 
18
 See Erdorf et al. (2011), p.4 and Amihud/Lev (1981), pp. 609 and 615. 
19
 See Shleifer/Vishny (1989), pp. 123-125. 
20
 Cf. Jensen (1986), pp. 323-324 and 328. 
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They also find that the extent of the value loss is significantly lower for firms that 
operate in related industries, probably because the obtainable synergies reduce the costs 
of diversification.
21
 
Servaes (1996) investigates the changes of diversification over time and discovers 
that multi-segment firms traded at a discount during the M&A wave of the 1960s and at 
no discount during the 1970s. He also finds that firms with higher managerial equity 
ownership abstained from diversifying-mergers in the 1960s. Some of them diversified 
in the 1970s when the discount disappeared.
22
 
Scharfstein (1998) reports that conglomerates, on average, overinvest in industries 
with low opportunities and underinvest in industries with high opportunities. This 
phenomenon is stronger when managers have lower equity stakes, which he links to 
higher agency problems. Over the 14 sampled years, however, more than two-thirds of 
the included firms re-focused or were acquired, which the author takes as evidence 
against the efficacy of multibusiness operations.
23
 
Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) find a negative relation between managerial equity 
ownership and value-destroying diversification, suggesting that the alignment of owner 
and agent interests could reduce the diversification discount. They also find that agency 
problems are the reason why value-destroying firms remain diversified despite re-
focusing would be the more valuable and efficient solution.
24
 
This was also confirmed by a more recent study by Sautner/Villalonga (2010), 
who find that firms with higher ownership concentration benefit from a much more 
efficient internal capital market, because the stronger owners are able to exert stronger 
control on the firm’s managers. The benefits of ownership concentration therefore 
outweigh its cost and reduce the value-destroying effects of corporate diversification.
25
 
John/Ofek (1995) study the performance improvements related to asset divestures 
by US-firms. They document a significant performance improvement in the three years 
that follow the divesture, but only for firms that increased their focus. They also find 
that focus-increasing firms have higher abnormal stock and that the value gains are 
                                                 
 
21
 They define industries with a low Tobin’s q ratio as those with limited opportunities. See Berger/Ofek 
(1995), p. 40. 
22
 See Servaes (1996), pp. 1222-1223. 
23
 See Scharfstein (1998), p. 21. 
24
 See Denis/Denis/Sarin (1997), pp. 156-158. 
25
 See Sautner/Villalonga (2010), pp. 26-27. 
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greater when there is a better fit between the divested asset and the buyer (i.e. what 
Berger/Ofek defined as relatedness).
26
 
Comment/Jarrell (1995) study the trend towards greater operational focus found 
in the 1980s, which followed the diversification trend of the 1970s. Their results show 
not only that greater focus is associated with greater shareholder wealth, but also that 
diversified firms often do not benefit from the advantages commonly associated with 
diversification, such as economies of scope or greater use of debt due to coinsurance 
between business units.
27
 
Daley/Mehrotra/Sivakumar (1997) also report that re-focusing strategies and 
corporate spin-offs increase firm value and return-on-assets. Excess stock returns have 
also been found to significantly increase upon the announcement of the spin-off 
decision. These performance improvements could only be observed for cross-industry 
spin-offs and not for own-industry (i.e. related) spinoffs. The authors argue that 
removing unrelated business units allows managers to focus their attention on core 
operations, which improves their decision-making.
28
 
Desai/Jain (1999) find that focus-increasing spin-offs can explain the improved 
long-run stock market performance found in a sample of 155 firms. The principal 
reason for non-focus-increasing spin-offs is to sell underperforming units. Nonetheless, 
re-focusing firms are found to outperform non-focus-increasing firms by 47.7%.
29
 
Krishnaswami/Subramaniam (1999) explore the effect of divestment on firm 
value and conclude that spin-offs increase firm value for diversified firms that were 
characterised by strong information asymmetry before the spin-off. Since this is true 
both for related and for unrelated diversification, they conclude that information 
asymmetry (and not negative synergies) is the main cause of the diversification 
discount.
30
 
The cross-subsidisation theory is supported by Rajan/Servaes/Zingales (2000), 
who find that highly diversified firms transfer resources from units with above-average 
                                                 
 
26
 See John/Ofek (1995), pp. 121-122 and 124-125. 
27
 While 62% of firms in their sample was diversified in the 1970s, only 44% was diversified in the 
1980s. See Comment/Jarrell (1995), pp. 68 and 74-75. 
28
 See Daley/Mehrotra/Sivakumar (1997), p. 280. 
29
  Measured using abnormal stock returns for the three years following the divesture. See Desai/Jain 
(1999), pp. 99-100. 
30
Information asymmetry is proxied in their study using analyst forecast errors. See 
Krishnaswami/Subramaniam (1999), p. 110. 
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opportunities to units with below-average opportunities. They argue that this is the 
principal reason why multi-segment firms trade at a discount.
31
 
Bodnar/Tang/Weintrop (1999) were the first to also include cross-border 
diversification in the analysis, thereby opening the question about the validity of 
previous studies. Their results, however, also confirmed that industrial diversification is 
value-destroying. Geographic diversification instead was found to be valued positively, 
even after controlling for self-selection.
32
 
2.2. Methodological issues of those studies and more recent results 
Towards the end of the 1990s and going forward, an increasing number of 
researchers started raising some concerns regarding the methodology used by previous 
studies. In particular, it was argued that the discount was found due to sample selection 
bias, endogeneity of the choice of diversifying, the use of COMPUSTAT as a data 
source and by other methodological issues.
33
 Additionally, earlier studies have been 
criticised for the small number of pure-play firms used to compute industry qs, the 
exclusion of financial industries from the sample and for the use of the book value of 
debt to compute Tobin’s q.34 
Hyland/Diltz (2002) infer that the valuation differences are not caused by 
diversification per se, as diversifying firms are endogenously different from non-
diversifying ones, regarding aspects such as cash, R&D expenses, executive salaries and 
the type of industries they operate in. Moreover, they argue that diversifying firms 
traded at a discount even before they diversified.
35
 This finding is confirmed also by 
Lamont/Polk (2002), who find also that part of the discount is attributable to exogenous 
industry shocks that negatively affect the capital allocation of firms towards 
underperforming units.
36
 
Matsusaka (2001) turns around the common argument that diversification causes 
value loss. He explains that it is the value discount that pushes firms to diversify and not 
vice versa. Furthermore, he adds also that declining sales often push companies to apply 
                                                 
 
31
  See Rajan/Servaes/Zingales (2000), pp. 61 and 76-77. 
32
 The issue of global diversification is discussed in greater detail in paragraph 2.4. See 
Bodnar/Tang/Weintrop (1999), p. 2. 
33
 COMPUSTAT is a commercial database that includes information such as sales and asset value for 
business segments (cf. SFAS 14 / 131 for a precise definition of “segment”). 
34
 See Erdorf et al. (2011), pp. 11 and 20. 
35
 See Hyland/Diltz (2002), p. 76. 
36
 See Lamont/Polk (2002), pp. 53, 59-60 and 75. 
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their valuable resources and capabilities to other sectors in order to survive. According 
to the author, firms diversify on an experimental basis until they find a suitable new 
market to access. The discount is thus caused by the underachievement of unsuccessful 
units.
37
 
Schoar (2002) discovers that diversified firms are generally more productive than 
focused firms and that the discount is attributable to the value dissipation caused by 
higher wages paid by conglomerates. Since this is suboptimal from the point of view of 
shareholders, they therefore discount the market values of conglomerates.
38
 
Gomes/Livdan (2004) dispute the notion that the discount should be interpreted 
against corporate diversification. They replicate Lang/Stulz (1994)’s results and assert 
that diversification is a natural response to a firm’s profit-maximising strategy. 
Similarly to Matsusaka (2001) and Hyland/Diltz (2002), they argue that when firms 
become unprofitable they seek new fortune in new sectors. They also add that this a-
priori-difference is what studies measure as a discount compared to focused firms that 
are already successful in their sectors.
39
 
Focusing on M&As, Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) find similar results to 
Hyland/Diltz (2002). They also claim that half of the discount that has been found by 
previous studies can be explained by pre-existing differences between the acquired units 
and the benchmark-firms used for comparison. In particular, their results point out that 
acquired units, in most cases, traded at a discount compared to non-acquired single-
segment firms even before their acquisition.
40
 
A substantial part of the loss is also correlated to a firm’s choice of corporate 
governance. Hoechle et al. (2012) added governance variables to their regression 
models and found that by controlling for the type and quality of corporate governance 
the discount moves towards zero. This is closely related to the agency theories provided 
in earlier studies.
41
 
Campa and Kedia (2002) also claim that underlying firm characteristics are the 
reason for the discount and not the actual choice of diversifying. Opting for a diversified 
strategy is also often due to industry effects and not to pure firm-related decisions. By 
                                                 
 
37
 See Matsusaka (2001), pp. 420-421. 
38
 See Schoar (2002), pp. 2401-2402. 
39
 See Gomes/Livdan (2004), p. 508. 
40
 See Graham/Lemmon/Wolf (2002), p. 717. 
41
 See Hoechle et al. (2012), p. 58. 
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controlling for endogeneity and for firms’ characteristics, they find that the evidence in 
favour of a diversification discount is significantly reduced and that in some cases even 
a premium can be found. Their results suggest that diversified firms systematically 
differ in size, growth and capital expenditure from single-segment firms used as 
benchmark in previous studies.
42
 
Mansi and Reeb (2002) analyse the effects of risk on companies’ excess values 
and claim that a substantial part of the diversification discount can be explained by the 
risk reduction attributable to diversification. They also find that the discount is strongly 
correlated to leverage, and that multi-segment firms with a low long-term debt ratio 
trade at no significant discount. A further finding of their research is that the book value 
of debt is more downward biased than the market value of debt; this suggests that 
results for firms with a high debt ratio could be skewed because of the approximation 
used to calculate excess values.
43
 
Table I presents a summary of the major results of studies of the 1990s and the 
early 2000s. It can be seen how all the earlier studies found the existence of a 
diversification discount, ranging from 6% to 59% in the United States, with the 
exception of Germany. Starting from Villalonga (1999), however, studies started 
correcting for sample selection bias or other methodological issues. While the 
uncorrected results of the later studies still yielded a discount, the correction, in most 
cases, made the discount disappear or even turn into a premium. The most significant 
change was measured by Campa/Kedia (2002), who found a premium of up to 30% 
after correcting for fixed effects in their regression model.
44
 
More recent studies come to different conclusions according to the chosen 
methodology. Villalonga (2004) argues that the use of COMPUSTAT or LRD (the two 
most commonly used data sources) is the reason why previous studies found that 
diversified firms trade at a discount and not at a premium. One major problem with 
COMPUSTAT is that it only allows the reporting of a maximum of ten business 
segments, while a more precise disaggregation would allow for a more consistent 
comparability across industries. Using alternative data, Villalonga was able to create a 
sample in which the average number of establishments across all firms is 122. Also, the 
                                                 
 
42
 See Campa/Kedia (2002), pp. 1759-1760. 
43
 See Mansi/Reeb (2002), pp. 2181-2182. 
44
 See Villalonga (2003), p. 2. 
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number of units in her sample is almost five times larger than the average number of 
segments obtained by COMPUSTAT data. Some other databases also only include data 
on specific industries, such as manufacturing firms, which may be endogenously 
different than other firms and non-representative of the whole economy. Villalonga also 
argues that an issue with many previous studies is that they did not consider vertical 
integration as a form of diversification. Related diversification has been proven to be 
significantly less value-destroying than unrelated diversification and vertical integration 
should therefore be measured separately. 
45
 
Table I : Estimates of the diversification discount in previous literature 
This table, originally published in Villalonga (2003), lists the results of the most 
important researches on the valuation of corporate diversification from the beginning of 
the 1990s to the early 2000s. The table contains the initial (uncorrected) univariate or 
multivariate regression results of each study and, where available, the corrected results 
for sample selection bias and other methodological issues. The method employed to 
measure the discount is also listed. 
 
Uncorrected Corrected Measure 
Lang and Stulz (1994) -0.27 to -0.54 
 
Tobin’s q 
Berger and Ofek (1995) -13% to -15% 
 
Assets and sales multipliers 
Servaes (1996) -0.06 to -0.59 
 
Tobin’s q 
Lins and Servaes (1999) 
0% Germany  
Assets and sales multipliers -10% Japan 
 
-15% U.K. 
 
Lins and Servaes (2002) -7% 
 
Assets and sales multipliers 
Villalonga (1999) -0.08 to -0.24 +0.08 to +0.34 Tobin’s q 
Graham et al. (2002) -9.6% to -13.7% -5.7% to -6.6% Assets and sales multipliers 
Campa and Kedia (2002) -9% to -13% 0% to +30% Assets and sales multipliers 
Mansi and Reeb (2002) -4.50% 0% Assets and sales multipliers 
Villalonga (2003) -0.18 0.28 Tobin’s q 
Source: Villalonga (2003), p. 2 
 
Choe/Yin (2009) argue that diversified firms usually benefit from a more efficient 
internal capital market that allows individual units to overcome problematic budget 
constraints, especially in periods of distress. They find that, as long as the advantages of 
the more efficient internal capital market are not outbalanced by the costs of 
information rents to divisional managers, multi-segment firms don’t trade at any 
discount.
46
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 See Villalonga (2004), pp. 479-482. 
46
 See Choe/Yin (2009), pp. 190-191. 
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Wulf (2009) instead explains that corporations’ inefficiencies are caused by 
divisional managers’ ability to skew information, by their compensation schemes and 
by the public signals of investment opportunities. As the ability to skew information is 
much greater in diversified firms, decision-makers need to pay much more attention to 
external signals, which adds to the internal inefficiencies caused by divisional managers’ 
private interests.
47
 
Xi He (2009) finds a strong correlation between firm size and the extent of the 
diversification discount. Poorly performing firms are more likely to diversify because 
they might believe this strategy to be beneficial for their situation and hope to regain 
some value by engaging in new businesses. His results indicate that some 
diversification is value-enhancing, although only up to a certain point. Moreover, value 
loss occurs at higher degrees of diversification, partially contradicting Lang and Stulz's 
(1994) results that find that the discount already starts when firms move from one to 
two segments. Finally, post-1997 data in his sample yields different results than 
previous data, most likely due to the accounting reforms introduced in the United States 
in 1997. He therefore argues that post-1997 studies should be interpreted with this in 
mind.
48
 
The most notable accounting reform of 1997 was the introduction of SFAS 131, 
which replaced SFAS 14. The standard became effective for the fiscal years that began 
after the 15th December 1997 and regulates the compulsory and discretionary 
disclosures of firms in the United States. Berger/Hann (2003) report a significant 
increase not only in the number of reported firm-segments, but also more disaggregated 
information and better forecast accuracy by investors. The same is found by Ettredge et 
al. (2013), who also confirm that the quality of financial information noticeably 
increased after the introduction of the new standard.
 49
 
Heinrichs/Erdorf/Hartmann-Wendels (2011) analyse firm valuations according to 
the relatedness of the business units. Contrary to previous findings, their results suggest 
that firms with highly independent segments are better valued than firms that perform 
related-only diversification. This is due to the fact that unrelated diversification reduces 
the probability of default and thereby increases the present value of future cash flows 
                                                 
 
47
 See Wulf (2009), pp. 316-317. 
48
 See He (2009), pp. 361-362. 
49
 See Berger/Hann (2003), pp. 211-212 and Ettredge et al. (2013), p. 801. A brief summary of SFAS 131 
can be found at http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum131.shtml. 
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(as they are more likely to be achieved). They also argue that cross-subsidisation of 
distressed segments by more profitable segments is usually positive and not value-
destroying.
50
 
Stock returns and their skewness could also explain a substantial part of the 
differential. Mitton and Vorkink (2010), for instance, find that stock returns of single-
segment firms have higher positive skewness than the stocks of diversified firms. They 
argue that this can explain up to 53% of the excess returns that characterise diversified 
firms, since these have to compensate investors with higher average returns for the lack 
of upward potential (the positive skewness) of their stock, or otherwise they will trade at 
a discounted price.
51
 
Brendel/Rudolph/Schwetzler (2013) use the so-called Oxaca-Blinder 
decomposition to provide an alternative measurement to conventional OLS regressions. 
This method allows them to separate the diversification discount into an “explained” 
and an “unexplained” part. The “explained” part is that which other studies usually try 
to account for using control variables in the regression (e.g. size, profitability, debt, etc.). 
The unexplained part is interpretable as the effect of unobservable omitted variables that 
affect the dummy coefficients, such as, for instance, agency costs. They also find that 
the conflict between majority and minority shareholders can explain part of the discount 
found for larger conglomerates. The discount created by the extraction of private 
benefits of majority shareholders to the disadvantage of the others.
52
 
Overall, it is clear how the mind-set towards diversification has greatly shifted 
after the early 2000s. While many studies have shown that it disappears when 
controlling for different characteristics, there is still no unanimous opinion on the causes 
of the discount and on how to measure it. 
2.3. The 2008 financial crisis 
The 2008 financial crisis was a great shock for the global economy, which has yet 
to completely recover to its pre-2008 state. It has led academics and practitioners to 
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 See Heinrichs/Erdorf/Hartmann-Wendels (2011), pp. 27-29. 
51
 See Mitton/Vorkink (2010), pp. 27-28. 
52
 It has to be noted that Brendel/Rudolph/Schwetzler (2013)’s study is based on companies operating in 
Germany, where, according to Lins/Servaes (1999), there is no observable discount between 
diversified and non-diversified firms. Their study still needs to be replicated using data from the 
United States. See Brendel/Rudolph/Schwetzler (2013), pp. 1-3, 7-8 and 21-22. 
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question many widely held beliefs about business and economics, including the one 
about the value of corporate diversification.
53
 
One major impact of the crisis was the so-called “credit crunch”, defined as the 
tightening of banks’ lending conditions to consumers and private corporations. Figure I 
depicts the change in lending standards for private companies between 1990 and 2013 
and the spreads between banks’ loan rates and their cost of funds. On the first graph a 
spike can be observed towards the end of 2007, representing how banks suddenly 
tightened their lending conditions, making it very difficult for corporations to obtain 
loans and thereby causing significant liquidity shortages. It is evident that these 
conditions, together with all the other negative effects of the financial and economic 
crisis, had a substantial impact not only on firms’ operations but also on their valuation. 
It can be observed from the second graph in Figure I how borrowing costs have 
increased for US firms during the recent crisis. Yan/Yang/Jiao (2010) demonstrate that 
when external capital becomes more costly the investment of focused firms decreases 
while the investment of diversified firms is unaffected. They also find that with 
depressed capital markets, it becomes more efficient for firms to allocate funds 
internally; this alleviates external financing constraints caused by higher borrowing 
costs. The empirical analysis also demonstrates how the market value of diversified 
firms is less affected than the value of focused firms during a financial crisis.
54
 
Even before the recent crisis, it was empirically shown that diversified firms 
perform significantly better than focused firms during economic downturns. 
Dimitrov/Tice (2006) demonstrate that single-segments firms exhibit larger average 
drops in sales growth and inventory growth when the economy slows down, compared 
to their multi-segment competitors.
55
 
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2010) affirm that the diversification discount 
disappeared during the recent financial crisis because investors became more risk averse 
and diversified firms were perceived as being a safer investment than single-segment 
firms. They argue that multibusiness firms benefit from higher debt capacity and from 
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the fact that their internal capital markets can substitute the inefficient external market 
during a crisis.
56
 
Figure I: US lending standards 1990-2013 
Survey of up to eighty large domestic banks and twenty-four U.S. branches and 
agencies of foreign banks conducted by the Federal Reserve quarterly, timing it so that 
results are available for the January/February, April/May, August, and 
October/November meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee. Questions cover 
changes in the standards and terms of the banks' lending and the state of business and 
household demand for loans. The first graph depicts how firms perceive the state of 
general lending standards to be at the time. The second graph represents the spread of 
loan rates over banks’ cost of funds. 
 
 
Source: US Federal reserve Board: Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank 
Lending Practices (July 2013).
57
  
 
Amit/Livnat/Zarowin (1991) show that diversified firms have more stable 
earnings than non-diversified firms but greater potential profitability in normal 
conditions. Since investors are also more likely to prefer safer investments during a 
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recession or a financial crisis, the lower volatility could explain the diversification 
discount during non-crisis periods, as it reduces the potential profitability for investors. 
In a downturn, however, the lower volatility could be perceived as beneficial.
58
 
Hovakimian (2011) argue that agency problems become less significant during a 
financial crisis. While conglomerates tend to overinvest into low growth segments 
during non-recession periods, during an economic downturn they focus their 
investments on more efficient and better performing segments, and therefore have a 
competitive advantage over focused firms.
59
 
The potential impact of the financial crisis on the valuation of diversified firms is 
therefore a very interesting topic that has yet to be analysed form different perspectives. 
The present thesis will examine how it relates to different types of diversification, 
including global, related and unrelated. 
2.4. Industrial vs. Global Diversification 
Global diversification is different from industrial diversification, as it is not 
product-specific but nation-specific. Many firms that operate internationally, in fact, 
focus on one product type only.
60
 The most common benefits of geographical 
diversification are economies of scale and scope, but it is also argued that cross-border 
investments reduce revenue fluctuations and spread the risk over different countries. 
Additionally it increases firms’ market power and allows the exploitation of the market 
imperfections and natural resources of other countries and thus enables higher returns 
than in the local market. Operating in different environments also enhances a firm’s 
knowledge and capabilities.
61
 
Global expansion, however, also has its costs. Initially firms can suffer from 
liability of newness and foreignness, which makes it more difficult to compete against 
well-established local firms that have been operating in the market for several years. 
Psychic distance can increase a firm’s difficulties in the new market, as its operations 
may need strong adaptations in order to be effective. The increasing scope of operations 
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can also generate growing costs and inefficiencies due to coordination difficulties and 
information asymmetry between divisional managers and headquarters.
62
 
Early studies on the valuation of diversification focused on cross-industry rather 
than cross-border diversification. Lang/Stulz (1994) were among the first to analyse the 
valuation effects of multinational expansion and its relation to industrial diversification 
in detail. They found that multi-segment firms trade at a discount even when controlling 
for global expansion; multinationals, instead, are found to be more valuable than their 
domestic counterparts.
63
  
Denis/Denis/Yost (2002) also measured the effects of global diversification. They 
adapted Berger/Ofek (1995)’s method to cross-border diversification and found that, on 
average, global diversification yields the same discounts found for industrial 
diversification in earlier studies. While Bodnar/Tang/Weintrop (1999) used equity-to-
sales ratio and Tobin’s q to measure excess value, Denis/Denis/Yost (2002) chose total 
capital as a proxy for firm value. This approach could be problematic if the median 
benchmark firm significantly differs from the segments of diversified firms; the 
difference could explain the inconsistencies between the results of the two researches.
64
 
Dos Santos/Errunza/Miller (2008) find that unrelated cross-border acquisitions 
yield an average 24% discount compared to their domestic counterparts. This does not 
apply to M&As and for related acquisitions, since no discount can be found over a two-
year period after the operation has been carried out. The discount also seems to appear 
only for “first-time” acquirers and not for already established MNCs.65 
Gande/Schenzler/Senbet (2009), when controlling for country and industry 
characteristics, find a discount for geographic diversification too. Contrary to previous 
studies, they also find a positive and significant correlation between firm value and the 
percentage of foreign sales to total firm sales.
66
 
Hope/Thomas (2008) argue that agency costs for shareholders increase for 
multinationals, as it becomes more difficult and costly to monitor managers’ operations 
in foreign countries. International operations create stronger information asymmetries 
between principal an agent and give greater space to managers for earnings 
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management. In fact, foreign earnings are consistently associated with lower 
profitability.
67
 
Jiraporn/Kim/Mathur (2008), on the other hand, argue that diversification 
mitigates managers’ possibilities for earnings management. They find that industrial 
diversification lessens this phenomenon by 1.8% and the combination of industrial and 
geographic diversification by 2.5%, partially contradicting Hope/Thomas (2008)’s 
hypotheses. 
Lins/Servaes (1999) analyse the valuation of diversification for different countries 
and compare it to the discount found in the United States. They find that there are strong 
differences among nations, as diversified firms trade at a 15% discount in the United 
Kingdom and of 10% in Japan, while there appears to be no discount in Germany.
68
 
Khanna/Palepu (2000) find that in emerging economies, such as India, diversified 
firms have an advantage over focused firms, since they are able to overcome the 
inefficiencies bound to their imperfect market environment, such as deficient contract 
enforcement, inability to protect property rights and flawed regulatory structures. Since 
these disadvantages are greater than those introduced by diversification, multi-segment 
firms are more valuable than focused firms.
69
 
Fauver/Houston/Naranjo (2003) also find that the valuation of diversification is 
positive in developing countries. A discount is found only in those countries where 
capital markets are well developed and internationally integrated and where the legal 
system is able to protect company rights.
70
 
These country-level differences speak in favour of considering cross-border 
operations separately from cross-industry ones when analysing corporate diversification. 
Overall, it is clear that the topic of global diversification is of great interest and can be 
analysed from many perspectives, and that many issues are open for interpretation. This 
thesis has put its focus on the valuation of globally diversified firms over the past 
fifteen years. In the next chapters it will be shown that there have been significant 
changes which could be attributable to how the financial crisis changed investors’ 
perceptions. 
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3. Methodology 
The empirical part of this thesis is based on the research of Lang/Stulz (1994), 
Berger/Ofek (1995) and Denis/Denis/Yost (2002). Diversification has been measured 
using Lang/Stulz (1994)’s excess value (EV) method, which is defined as the logarithm 
of the fraction of a firms Tobin’s q to its imputed q (see Figure III). Imputed q is a 
benchmark consisting of the sum of hypothetical values of a firm’s different business 
segments. These are calculated using median Tobin’s q of single-segment domestic 
firms (“pure players”) that operate in the same industry as the diversified firm’s 
segments, matched using SIC codes provided by COMPUSTAT.
 71
 A minimum of five 
different pure players with the same SIC code has been used to compute imputed q. 
When this was not possible at a four-digit SIC code level, firms where matched using 
only the first three or the first two digits. Table II below portrays how many firms could 
be matched at the four, three or two-digit level. 
This method is designed to estimate a firm’s value using the market value of 
independent non-diversified firms that operate in the same industries as the diversified 
firm. This should allow separating the premium or discount produced by the 
conglomeration of single units from the purely segment-specific value (i.e. to verify if 
the whole is greater or smaller than the sum of its parts). 
The minimum number of five segments needed to create a benchmark value 
should allow having consistent and solid benchmark figures; using the sales multiplier 
to create imputed values allows having benchmarks of the same size as the diversified 
firm. The OLS regression also contains control variables for other firm characteristics, 
such as expense ratios and profitability, to make sure that the premium or discount are 
not related to performance-specific characteristics of the firm. 
Tobin’s q has been calculated as the proportion of a firm’s market value (proxied 
by the sum of the market value of common stock plus the book value of debt and 
preferred stock) to its replacement cost (proxied by the book value of total assets). 
Using Tobin’s q allows for a more straightforward comparability across different firms 
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also without adjusting for risk or size, since it represents how the market perceives the 
firm’s value-adding capabilities.72 
Using the natural logarithm of the fraction instead of the difference of the two 
values allows for a more straightforward and intuitive interpretation of the results. 
Median values have been used to compute q instead of mean values in order to correct 
for the imputed values’ skewness, as can be observed in Figure II. Excess values were 
also computed with three other formulas, to allow for greater comparability with other 
studies that used these computations and also to verify this study’s robustness. The first 
alternative computation, EV1, has been calculated as the difference between a firm’s 
Tobin’s q and its imputed q, using average hypothetical q values. EV2 is computed as 
the natural logarithm of the ratio of Tobin’s q to imputed q. EV 3 uses the same formula 
as EV 1 but hypothetical qs are calculated using medians. EV4 is the value that has been 
chosen as the main dependent variable for all the calculations in the empirical part of 
this thesis. As explained above, it has been computed using median values of q and 
using the logarithm instead of the difference. The three alternative computations are 
employed in paragraph 5.3 to assess the robustness of the excess value measure used 
throughout the study. 
Figure II: Skewness of q 
Comparison of the density function of imputed q values 
computed using mean or median values. See Figure III for 
the computation of excess value measures. 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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It can be seen from Table II that the same proportion of firms as in 
Denis/Denis/Yost (2002) could be matched at the four-digit level, whereas a much 
lower proportion remained unmatched. This, however, is not of great importance, as 
unmatched firms are removed from the dataset after matching.
73
 To capture the effect of 
diversification in the multivariate regression analysis, different dummy variables were 
created for industrial, geographic and related/unrelated diversification, based on the 
methodologies developed by Lang/Stulz (1994), Berger/Ofek (1995) and 
Denis/Denis/Yost (2002). A firm has been classified as industrially diversified if is it 
reports sales with at least two different SIC codes in the COMPUSTAT Firm Segment 
File. A firm is classified as globally diversified if it reports sales in at least two 
geographical segments.
74
 A firm’s diversification is classified as unrelated if it reports 
sales with different SIC codes at the two-digit level in the same year.
75
 
To assess the impact of the financial crisis on the valuation of diversification, an 
interaction term has been included in the regression to separate pre-2008 data from post-
2008 data.
76
 The sample was then split into two groups (pre and post crisis) and 
regressed separately using OLS. Additional graphical and empirical analyses have been 
carried out on the variation of excess value over time; these results will be discussed in 
paragraph 5.2. 
In order to control for endogenous characteristics that might correlate with the 
decision to diversify, four additional values were included to account for industry 
characteristics of the firms.
77
 These are yearly industry growth rate (1997-2012), 
relative industry size (to total) and industry diversification trends, measured as fraction 
of diversified firms per industry.
78
 These, together with firm characteristics, were 
included in a fixed-effects model that should allow to account for endogenous traits and 
reduce omitted variable bias. 
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Table II: Matching segment to firm data 
Firm and imputed values have been matched using SIC codes. When this was not 
possible at a four-digit SIC code level, firms where matched using only the first three or 
the first two digits of their SIC code. Almost half of the firm-years could be matched at 
the (most precise) four-digit level. This table provides the statistic for the type of 
matching that could be made. 
 This research Denis/Denis/Yost (2002) 
Matched at 4-digit level 47.6% 47.5% 
Matched at 3-digit level 30.9% 23.3% 
Matched at 2-digit level 20.6% 26.0% 
Unmatched 0.8% 3.2% 
 
 
Figure III Calculation of excess value 
The present research’s empirical analysis has been carried out using Excess Value, based 
on the methods developed by Lang/Stulz (1994), Berger/Ofek (1995) and 
Denis/Denis/Yost (2002). Four different computations of excess value have been 
computed. Excess Value 1 has been calculated as the difference between a firm’s Tobin’s 
q and its imputed q, using mean hypothetical q values (qM). Excess Value 2 is computed 
as the natural logarithm of the ratio of Tobin’s q to the imputed q. EV 3 and 4 use the 
same formula as EV 1 and 2 but hypothetical qs are calculated using median values. 
Tobin’s q for a firm is its market value (MV), proxied by the market value of common 
equity plus the book value of preferred stock and debt, divided by replacement cost (RC), 
proxied by the book value of total assets as given by COMPUSTAT. Imputed q is 
calculated by assigning hypothetical qs (q*) to each segment of the firm, and then 
computing a weighted sum of these using firm and segment sales. Subscript j refers to 
segment j and n represents the total number of segments. Hypothetical qs for segments 
are estimated using mean or median qs for single-segment firms that operate in the same 
business as the diversified firm. 
          
                 
                     
  
         
  ∑   
 
 
   
(
             
          
) 
                
                      (
                
          
) 
                
                       (
                
           
) 
Adapted from Lang/Stulz (1994), Denis/Denis/Yost (2002), Berger/Ofek (1995) and Villalonga 
(2004) 
 
4. Data and sample selection 
All the sample data used in the present research has been extracted from the 
COMPUSTAT Industry Segment and Geographic Segment tapes, except from the 
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industry information used in the fixed-effects model, which has been taken from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce’s website.79 
The original sample consisted of firm-level and segment-level data between 1997 
and 2012 and included 157,240 and 1,020,803 observations respectively. Following 
previous research, utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4900–4999 and 6000–6999) 
and firm-years with sales of less than $20 million have been removed from the 
sample.
80
 Firm-years in which the total of either industrial or global segment sales were 
not within one percent of total reported firm sales for that year were also deleted. After 
removing duplicate values, observations with missing data (e.g. no SIC code), 
inconsistent data (e.g. sum of segment sales not within 1% of total firm sales) and 
outliers, the segment-database was reduced to 261,549 observations and the firm-
database to the final 32,136 observations used for all the computations.
81
 Table III 
below reports a data comparison with the two previous studies on which the 
methodology of this thesis is based on. 
Table III: Comparison with Denis et al. 2002 and Lang/Stulz 1994 
Comparison of the key characteristics of this study’s dataset with the data used by 
Berger/Ofek (1995) and Denis/Denis/Yost (2002), on which the methodology of this 
study is based. 
 This study Denis/Denis/Yost (2002) Lang/Stulz 1994 
Years 1997-2012 1984-1997 1978-1990 
Nr. of Years 16 13 12 
Nr. of observations 32,136 34,200 18,225 
 
The fraction of diversified firms, displayed in Table IV, is reasonably consistent 
with the data of previous studies.
82
 This table also includes the average number of 
geographic segments per firm-year, a figure that was not available before 1997 and 
therefore could not be used in previous studies.
83
 It can be seen that geographic 
diversification is much more common as industrial diversification; approximately half 
of US firms reported to diversify abroad. This value is greater than the one reported by 
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Denis/Denis/Yost (2002). This difference to previous studies could be explained by the 
increased reporting introduced by SFAS 131. 
Table IV also shows that the majority of firms that diversify industrially are also 
multinationals, while about one-fourth of multinationals are also multi-segment. 
Correlation measures between industrial and global diversification are reported in Table 
V, from which it can be clearly seen that the correlation is fairly strong and significant. 
Table IV: Measures of global and industrial diversification 
Mean of industrial and global diversification measures for 32,136 firm-years over the 
period 1997–2012. A firm has been defined as industrially diversified if it reports sales 
with at least two different SIC Codes. A firm has been defined as globally diversified if 
it reports sales in at least two geographic segments. 
 
All Firm-
Years 
(n = 32,136) 
Industrially 
Diversified 
(n = 5,968) 
Globally 
Diversified 
(n = 15,905) 
Industrial Diversification    
Fraction of firm-years industrially 
diversified 
0.1857 1.000 0.2457 
Average number of industrial 
segments 
1.2761 2,4868 1.3862 
Global Diversification    
Fraction of firm-years globally 
diversified 
0.4732 0.2498 1.000 
Average number of geographic 
segments 
2.1329 2.7611 3.6756 
Fraction export sales 0.0167 0.0002 0.0346 
 
Table V: Correlation among measures of diversification 
Time-series correlation between firm-year levels of global and industrial diversification. 
Significance levels are reported using three, two, or one asterisk, denoting a level of 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. 
 
Multi-segment Dummy Number of Segments 
Global dummy 0.1527*** 0.1574*** 
% export sales 0.0058___ 0.0135**_ 
 
A potential issue with the data arises from the chosen source. Villalonga (2004) 
criticised the use of COMPUSTAT data for studies on diversification and claimed that 
the finding of a discount is due to a bias introduced by this data. Using alternative 
sources, she found that multi-segment firms actually trade at a premium.
84
 Nonetheless, 
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COMPUSTAT has been chosen as the principal data source for this thesis, since 
Villalonga (2004)’s methodology introduces other issues, such as the exclusion of 
unrelated diversification from the computation; unrelated diversification usually yields 
a greater discount than related diversification.
85
 This possibility has been taken into 
account and Berger/Ofek (1995)’s method to account for relatedness has been adapted 
and applied to this research. 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics and excess value measures 
Table VI reports descriptive statistics for firms’ principal characteristics. At first 
inspection of the four different categories of firms significant differences among them 
can be found depending on their choice of diversification. It can be seen that diversified 
firms, on average, tend to have a larger market valuation than non-diversified firms and 
that multi-business domestic firms tend to be larger, spend a smaller fraction of their 
revenues on R&D and capital and are more profitable than specialised firms. Single-
segment multinationals are also larger than single-segment domestic firms, but are not 
larger than multi-segment domestic firms. Industrial diversification therefore seems to 
be connected to firm size much more strongly than global diversification. The most 
important aspect that has to be noted is the evident relation between diversification and 
size. 
These differences point out that there could be endogenous characteristics that 
influence the choice of diversification of a firm. Using Tobin’s q to calculate excess 
value should resolve the issue of firm size. A fixed-effects regression will be presented 
and discussed in paragraph 6.3 in order to assess the effects of endogenous 
characteristics on the choice of diversification and therefore its valuation by the 
financial markets.Table VII contains a comparison of mean excess value measures for 
different types of diversification strategies. It shows that multi-segment domestic firms 
are more highly valued than their single-segment counterparts; the same is true for 
multi-segment global firms. While industrial diversification yields a premium, global 
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diversification does not appear to be as valuable for investors, neither for single-
segment, nor for multi-segment firms.
86
 
It has to be noted that the mean excess value for single-segment domestic firms 
appears to be positive and significant (although small). This would make the data 
inconsistent, as hypothetical “pure-player” firms would be systematically undervalued 
compared to actual “pure-player” firms. However, the median excess value for single-
segment domestic firms is zero, which means that the matching is consistent; the 
inconsistency is caused by firms with exceptionally large excess values, which therefore 
skew the mean value. For this reason, median values have been used throughout the 
empirical analysis instead of means. 
Table VI: Firm characteristics 
Descriptive statistics on various firm characteristics for the sample of 32,136 firm-year 
observations over the period 1997–2012. The sample is partitioned into four groups on the basis 
of whether the firm is industrially or globally diversified in the given firm-year. Firms are 
classified as multi-segment (i.e. industrially diversified) if they report more than one business 
segment on COMPUSTAT’s Industry Segment File. Firms are classified as multinational (i.e. 
globally diversified) if COMPUSTAT’s Geographic Segment File reports more than one 
geographic segments or export sales greater than 10% of total sales. Market value of total capital 
is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value 
of equity. Means are reported with median values in italics below 
Firm Characteristic 
Single-segment 
Domestic 
Multi-segment 
Domestic 
Single-segment 
Multinational 
Multi-segment 
Multinational 
Market value of total capital 
($mill.) 
2241 6910 4331 12487 
341 1125 689 2587 
Long-term debt / 
total assets 
0.2532 0.2637 0.1865 0.2207 
0.1919 0.2441 0.1253 0.2003 
EBIT/sales 
-0.0133 0.0745 0.0154 0.0842 
0.0551 0.0734 0.0710 0.0843 
Capital expenditure/ 
Sales 
0.1684 0.0972 0.1047 0.0687 
0.0402 0.0390 0.0383 0.0375 
R&D/Sales 
0.1433 0.0168 0.1316 0.0460 
0.0708 0.0126 0.0805 0.0263 
Advertising expense/Sales 
0.0345 0.0262 0.0290 0.0263 
0.0180 0.0146 0.0114 0.0134 
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Table VII: Excess value measures 
Mean excess value measure comparison for different types of diversification 
strategies. The sample consists of 32,136 Firm-Years between 1997 and 2012. 
Excess value is measured as the logarithm of a firm’s Tobin’s q to its imputed q 
using median single-segment values. Significance levels are reported using 
three, two, or one asterisk, denoting if the mean or median value is different 
from zero at level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, and have been calculated using a 
standard two-tailed t-test and a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test, 
respectively. 
  N Mean Median Std. Error 
Domestic Only 
Single-Segment 14761_ 0.0136*** 0.0000___ 0.0044 
Multi-segment 2169_ 0.4014*** 0.3799*** 0.0125 
Multinational 
Single-Segment 11407_ 0.0095___ 0.0216___ 0.0056 
Multi-segment 3799_ 0.3517*** 0.3403*** 0.0109 
  
One of the aims of this thesis is to investigate if the 2008-financial crisis had an 
impact on the valuation of diversified firms. A preliminary look at this can be given 
using Table VIII, which displays the fraction of diversified firms for every year between 
1997 and 2012.  
The illustration shows that there has been a slight increasing trend in the fraction 
of diversified firms over the recent four to five years, which could be explained by the 
fact that the recent crisis has incentivised firms to diversify both industrially and 
globally. The graphical representation makes it also very evident how many more firms 
diversify internationally compared to industrially. This trend is even more evident if the 
increase in diversification is compared to the trend over the past 16 years. It can be 
observed from the graphical illustration in Table VIII how the fraction of globally 
diversified firms has remained fairly constant until 2010; the fraction of globally 
diversified firm, which had been slowly increasing until 2009, grew more rapidly in the 
more recent years. 
Figure IV displays the oscillations of excess value of industrially and globally 
diversified firms between 1997 and 2012. All four different types of excess value 
measures used for the empirical analysis of this thesis have been included in this 
representation.
87
 While these values have oscillated significantly over the years, it does 
not appear as if the financial crisis changed how diversified firms have been valued by 
investors and no clear trend can be identified after 2007 or 2008, despite the recent 
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increase in the fraction of diversified firms. The impact of the crisis will be further 
investigated with a multivariate regression analysis in the next paragraph. 
Table VIII: Average annual industrial and global diversification measures 
Fraction of industrially and globally diversified to total firms for each sampled year. 
Industrially diversified firms include those that are also globally diversified and vice-
versa. The fifth column displays the fraction of export sales for firms that are only 
globally diversified. The illustration below depicts the data in the table. 
Year N 
Fraction Industrially 
Diversified 
Fraction Globally 
Diversified 
Export of Globally 
Diversified 
1997 3616 0.1153 0.1659 0.0191 
1998 2992 0.1932 0.5033 0.0429 
1999 2304 0.2296 0.4748 0.0258 
2000 2360 0.1881 0.5030 0.0223 
2001 2169 0.1959 0.5224 0.0175 
2002 2089 0.1809 0.5357 0.0159 
2003 1907 0.1935 0.5422 0.0147 
2004 1899 0.1864 0.5355 0.0134 
2005 1805 0.1834 0.5485 0.0091 
2006 1856 0.1891 0.5566 0.0101 
2007 1790 0.1743 0.5324 0.0109 
2008 1748 0.1842 0.5383 0.0076 
2009 1630 0.1847 0.5601 0.0075 
2010 1569 0.1899 0.5813 0.0060 
2011 1614 0.2131 0.6016 0.0068 
2012 788 0.2728 0.6371 0.0069 
All 32136 0.1857 0.4949 0.0168 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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Figure IV: Excess value over time 
Oscillations of the different measures of excess value between 1997 and 2012 
for multi-segment and multinational firms. EV4 is the excess value measure 
that has been used for all the empirical analyses of the present thesis. See 
chapter 3 for a more detailed explanation of excess value computations. 
 
Industrially diversified firms 
 
 
Globally diversified firms 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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5.2. Multivariate regression analysis 
Table X contains the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of 
excess value on a series of dummies measuring different types of diversification and 
several control variables. Separate dummies have been used for firms that are only 
industrially diversified, only globally diversified or both. The regression also includes a 
dummy variable dividing the sample in pre and post 2007 and a dummy if the firm 
diversifies in related industries only.
88
 The control variables are the same used by 
previous studies and include the market value of total capital (computed using the 
market value of stock and the book value of debt), the ratio of long-term debt to total 
capital and the ratios of capital expenditures, EBIT, R&D expense and advertising 
expense to sales.
89
 
Contrary to the findings of the studies on which the present research is based on, 
industrial diversification is associated with a statistically significant valuation premium 
of 22.5%.
90
 Global diversification, instead, yields a statistically significant discount of 
6.7%. This finding does not match Denis/Denis/Yost (2002)’s of an industrial discount 
of 20% The existence of a global discount is found in both studies, although their 
discount was of over 18%.
91
 
The combination of industrial and global diversification yields an additional 
premium of 9%, which would suggest that multibusiness MNCs are valued favourably 
by financial markets, while focused MNCs are not. This does not depend on the firm’s 
size, expressed by its market value, as the regression coefficient is zero. This is also not 
consistent with Denis/Denis/Yost (2002): the combination of both types of 
diversification yielded an additional discount of 32% in their study. 
The results for the controlling variables are all reasonably straightforward, as a 
premium is associated with higher profitability, R&D expenditure and advertising 
expense, while a discount is associated with the debt-to-capital ratio (as observed also in 
previous studies).
92
 Firms that limit their multi-segment operations only to related 
industries exhibit an additional discount of 22.4% compared to unrelated diversification. 
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 Related industries are those defined as having the first two digits of their SIC code in common. 
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 Cf. Denis/Denis/Yost (2002), p. 1967 and Berger/Ofek (1995), pp. 44-45. 
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 The presented percentages are obtained using log approximations, which are more accurate when the 
percentages are small.  
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 See Denis/Denis/Yost (2002), p. 1967. 
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 See Denis/Denis/Yost (2002), p. 1967. 
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This would suggest that investors favour “safer” firms that operate across unrelated 
markets, possibly contrasting the classic theory that investors are able to diversify more 
efficiently than firms.
93
 Most diversifying firms are in fact operating also in unrelated 
industries; less than one-third of analysed firm-years report sales in related industries 
only.
94
 This can be observed in Table IX. 
Table IX: Relatedness 
Type of diversification of multi-segment firms. A firm is defined as 
performing unrelated diversification if it reports any sales in 
segments that do not share the first two digits of their SIC code. 
 
Observations Fraction 
Unrelated diversification 4,260 0.7138 
Related diversification 1,708 0.2862 
 
The explanatory power of the regression measured by r-squared is relatively low 
compared to Denis/Denis/Yost (2002)’s 0.267, but is still in line with that of previous 
studies.
95
 The relatively high number of missing variables has reduced the regression 
sample from the original 32,136 to an actual 7,398 included observations, which still 
allows for significant and relevant results. 
If we look at the effects of the financial crisis, we can see that the dummy variable 
that divides the sample in pre and post 2007 is not significant at the 10% level. 
Additional regressions in which this dummy has been used as an interaction term with 
other diversification measures and other variables also yielded non-significant results. If, 
however, the sample is divided in two (pre and post crisis) sub-samples and two 
separate regressions are carried out (regression (2) and (3)), the results are quite 
different. It can be seen that the coefficients for diversification change significantly, 
which points out the existence of a structural break.
96
 
The results of the second and third regression convey that the crisis could have 
made investors more risk averse, as multi-segment firms trade at an even higher 
premium after the crisis (28.4% vs. 19.7%), while the geographic discount disappeared. 
Additionally, investors also seem to favour unrelated diversification, while they seemed 
to be indifferent before. This also suggests that there has been a shift towards firms that 
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 Assuming perfect capital markets. Cf. Levy/Sarnat (1970), p. 796. 
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 “Unrelated diversification” includes firms that diversify also in related industries. 
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 Cf. Lang/Stulz (1994), p. 1272 and Berger/Ofek (1995), p. 50. 
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 A Chow test for a structural break between 2007 and 2008 allows to reject the null-hypothesis of no 
break at the 5% but not at the 1% level. 
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benefit from non-perfectly correlated cash flow streams, a safer option during an 
economic crisis. 
Table X: Multivariate regression 
Ordinary least squares regressions of Excess Value on dummy variables denoting 
industrial and global diversification, and a set of control variables. Regressions (2) and 
(3) are performed on two subsamples to assess the impact of the financial crisis on 
Excess Value. Excess value is measured as the logarithm of a firm’s Tobin’s q to its 
imputed q. Imputed segment values are calculated using median Tobin’s q values for 
single-segment domestic firms in the same industry. A firm is industrially diversified if 
it reports more than one industrial business segment. A firm is globally diversified if 
COMPUSTAT’s Geographic Segment File reports more than one geographical 
segment. The sample is based on 32,136 firm-year observations over the period 1997–
2012. Significance levels are reported using three, two, or one asterisk, denoting a level 
of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. The White test rejects H0 of homoskedasticity at the 
0.01 level for the regression. Therefore, reported significance levels are calculated 
using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Independent Variables (1) 
1997-2007 
(2) 
2008-2012 
(3) 
Intercept  0.3533***  0.3557***  0.3557*** 
    
Diversification-related variables    
Dummy equal to one if only industrially 
diversified 
 0.2251***  0.1971***  0.2849*** 
Dummy equal to one if only globally diversified -0.0667*** -0.0796*** -0.0002___ 
Dummy equal to one if both industrially and 
globally diversified 
 0.0921***  0.0712*__  0.1460**_ 
Dummy equal to one if year is > 2007 -0.0130___   
Dummy equal to one if the diversified firm 
operates only in related industries 
-0.2244***  0.0000*** -0.2713*** 
    
Control variables    
Market value of total capital  0.0000*** -0.2084***  0.0000___ 
Long-term debt to total capital -0.7514***  0.0000*** -0.5517*** 
Capital expenditures to sales  0.1766**_ -0.8512*** -0.0356___ 
EBIT to sales  0.2282***  0.3558***  0.2033*__ 
R&D to sales  0.2194***  0.2388***  0.4081*** 
Advertising to sales  0.7476***  0.0700___  0.4650___ 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0906___  0.1029___  0.0806___ 
Number of observations 7398___ 5231___ 2167___ 
 
6. Robustness check 
6.1. Robustness over time 
To verify the regression’s consistency over time, the sample has been divided into 
four sub-samples of four years each. The results of these regressions are reported in 
Table XI. It can be seen that the premium of industrial diversification declined from the 
first to the third sub-period, while being significant only at the 10% level in the second 
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and non-significant in the third. In the fourth period, after the beginning of the crisis, it 
became positive and significant again. It might therefore be that the crisis inverted an 
on-going trend of decreasing industrial diversification premium. These results resemble 
those of Denis/Denis/Yost (2002), although their study used 1984-1997 data.
97
 
Global diversification, instead, displayed a much more unstable valuation over 
time as its regression coefficient was significant only in the second sub-period. It has to 
be noted that this partitioning of the sample reduced the number of observations 
significantly, in some cases affecting the regression’s explanatory power. 
Table XI: Multivariate regressions over time 
Ordinary least squares regressions of Excess Value on dummy variables denoting 
industrial and global diversification, and a set of control variables. The sample has been 
divided into four groups to compare Excess Value over time. The sample is based on 
32,136 firm-year observations over the period 1997–2012. Significance levels are 
reported using three, two, or one asterisk, denoting a level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
respectively. Reported significance levels are calculated using White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Independent Variables 
1997-2000 
(4) 
2001-2004 
(5) 
2005-2008 
(6) 
2009-2012 
(7) 
Intercept 0.3060*** 0.3383*** 0.3610*** 0.3252*** 
     
Diversification-related variables     
Dummy equal to one if only 
industrially diversified 
0.3573*** 0.1646*__ 0.1058___ 0.3334*** 
Dummy equal to one if only globally 
diversified 
-0.0409___ -0.1359*** -0.0348___ 0.0251___ 
Dummy equal to one if both 
industrially and globally 
diversified 
0.2363*** -0.0410___ 0.0653___ 0.2030*** 
Dummy equal to one if the 
diversified firm operates only in 
related industries 
-0.1292___ -0.1984*** -0.3011*** -0.2439*** 
     
Control variables     
Market value of total capital 0.0000**_ 0.0000**_ 0.0000___ -0.0000___ 
Long-term debt to total capital -0.8150*** -0.7721*** -0.7227*** -0.7287*** 
Capital expenditures to sales 0.1361___ 0.7611*** 0.2476___ -0.0452___ 
EBIT to sales 0.1291*** 0.2977*** 0.5336*** 0.1259___ 
R&D to sales 0.1797___ 0.1061___ 0.1823___ 0.3648**_ 
Advertising to sales 0.6054*** 0.7340**_ 1.1450*** 0.2593___ 
Adjusted R2 0.1154___ 0.0972___ 0.1073___ 0.0833___ 
Number of observations 1,656___ 2,010___ 2,090___ 1,642___ 
 
                                                 
 
97
 Cf. Denis/Denis/Yost (2002), p. 1968 
34 
 
6.2. Alternative estimation techniques 
Table XII presents five alternative regressions to measure the valuation of 
diversified firms. Regression (8) is based on pooled results of 16 separate regressions 
(one for each year).
98
 While the results are consistent with the previous regressions, the 
coefficients for diversification measures are not significant and adjusted R-squared is 
very low. Regression (9) employs total capital to calculate excess value instead of 
Tobin’s q and is computed as the natural logarithm of the fraction of firm total capital to 
imputed total capital. These results, however, do not support those of regression (1) and 
even suggest a positive effect of global diversification. This suggests that methods 
based on Tobin’s q and methods based on total capital might yield different results and 
could explain why different authors found contradicting results over the years. 
Using the segment value of assets instead of sales to assign weighted imputed 
values to each firm-year (regression (10)) yields consistent results to those of regression 
(1), although the premium for industrial diversification is lower and significant only at 
the 10% level. This could also be due to the fact that asset data was not available for as 
many firm-segments as sales data.
99
 
To control if the type of SIC code matching influences the results, firm-years have 
been matched to hypothetical qs using only the broadest 2-digit level. Using this data the 
coefficient for industrial diversification becomes negative and significant only at the 
10% level, while the coefficient for global diversification becomes insignificant. This 
could be due to the lack of precision when counting segment only on industry-basis. In 
fact, only 9.6% of firm-years result to be diversified this way, compared to 18.6% 
before. 
Changing the definition of geographic diversification (and therefore the formula 
to compute the dummy variable), to include also firms that report export sales greater 
than 10% of total sales, increases the discount for geographic diversification from 6.7% 
to 7.5%. This finding also supports the theory that foreign-centred firms are not viewed 
very favourably by the market. 
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had sales data. 
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Table XII: Alternative estimations 
Alternative estimations of excess value. Regression (1) has been copied to facilitate 
comparisons. Regression (8) is based on pooled results of 16 separate regressions (one 
for each year). Regression (9) employs total capital to calculate excess value instead of 
Tobin’s q and is computed as the natural logarithm of the fraction of firm total capital 
to imputed total capital. Regression (10) uses the assets instead of sales to assign 
weighted imputed values to each firm-year. For regression (11) firm-years have been 
matched to hypothetical qs using only the broadest 2-digit level. All the other 
characteristics are the same used for regression (1). The sample is based on 32,136 
firm-year observations over the period 1997–2012. Significance levels are reported 
using three, two, or one asterisk, denoting a level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. 
Reported significance levels are calculated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. 
Independent Variables 
 
(1) 
Mean of 
Annual 
Estimates 
(8) 
Using 
Total 
Capital 
(9) 
Asset-
weighted 
imputed qs 
(10) 
Matching 
at 2-digit 
level 
(11) 
Intercept  0.3533***  0.3559**_ 0.4817*** 0.6079*** 0.6317*** 
      
Diversification-related variables 
Dummy equal to one if only 
industrially diversified 
 0.2251***  0.2086___ 0.0783___ 0.1120*__ -0.0544*__ 
Dummy equal to one if only 
globally diversified 
-0.0667*** -0.0695___ 0.0446**_ -0.0665*** 0.0003___ 
Dummy equal to one if both 
industrially and globally 
diversified 
 0.0921*** 0.0950__ 0.1689*** 0.1346*** -0.0996*** 
Dummy equal to one if year is 
> 2007 
-0.0130___  0.0099___ -0.0110___ -0.0110___ 
Dummy equal to one if the 
diversified firm operates 
only in related industries 
-0.2244*** -0.2314___ -0.3992*** -0.4817*** -0.4040*** 
      
Control variables 
Market value of total capital  0.0000*** 0.0000___ 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000**_ 
Long-term debt to total capital -0.7514*** -0.8374*** -0.5739*** -0.7679*** -0.9758*** 
Capital expenditures to sales  0.1766**_  0.2954___ 0.8815*** 0.1671**_ 0.2220**_ 
EBIT to sales  0.2282***  0.4001**_ -0.0232___ 0.2315*** 0.2179*** 
R&D to sales  0.2194***  0.2333___ 0.5166*** 0.2430*** 0.4637*** 
Advertising to sales  0.7476***  0.7815___ 0.6602*** 0.8424*** 0.7861*** 
Adjusted R2 0.0906___ 0.0102___ 0.0983___ 0.1184___ 0.1034___ 
Number of observations 7398___ 462___ 7,398___ 6,880___ 7,398___ 
 
6.3. Fixed-effects model 
A common concern when measuring the valuation of corporate diversification is 
the fact that firms that diversify might be endogenously different to those who don’t and 
the discount could be explained by these characterising differences and not by the 
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choice of diversifying per se.
100
 It has already been shown that multi-segment firms 
differ from single-segment firms on size, profitability, capital expenditure and expenses 
on R&D and advertising. Additionally, firms might operate in industries that are 
intrinsically different from each other and this might correlate with the decision to 
diversify. Santalo/Becerra (2008), for instance, find that the valuation of diversified 
firms is not homogeneous across industries. In fact, diversified firms are valued at a 12-
28% discount in industries with a large number of specialised companies, whereas in 
industries where diversified firms are the majority, they trade at a 14-18% premium. 
They argue that in industries in which soft information (i.e. information that is not 
transferrable externally of the company) is very important diversified firms have a 
competitive advantage. Diversification also improves access to financial resources and 
gives an advantage in vertically integrated industries. 
101
 
As can be clearly seen in the first chart of Figure V, industries in the United States 
differ in yearly growth rates and significantly differ in size, as 2 out of 18 industries 
make up about 25% of yearly value added.
102
 The same can be seen in the following 
chart about the percentage of diversified firms per industry. Over 60% of utilities and 
manufacturing firms are globally diversified, compared to only 7% of the healthcare 
industry. The most industrially diversified industries are utilities and construction, 
where over 30% of firms operate also in another industry, while the same applies to less 
than 4% of accommodation and food services firms. These varying characteristics could 
indeed reveal that the choice of diversifying is industry-related and that the discount or 
premium is due to industry effects. To control for these differences, a fixed-effects 
regression has been computed, which should allow to control for firms’ endogenous 
characteristics and for omitted variable bias.
103
 Table XIII reports the results of the 
fixed-effects regression next to those of regression (1). The results of regression (12) 
show that the valuation of industrial diversification does not appear to be industry or 
size-related. The valuation of global diversification instead seems to be so, as the 
coefficient has become insignificant. The multi-segment/multibusiness dummy is still 
significant and displays an additional premium that increased from 9.2% to 15.8%. This 
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again speaks for a favourable market valuation of multiproduct MNCs. What can also 
be seen from regression (12) is that firms that operate in an industry with a high yearly 
growth rate suffer from a significant discount compared to firms of other industries, 
while industry size is not significant for firm valuation. 
Figure V: Industry characteristics 
The first chart depicts mean growth rates of US industries from 1997 to 2012, grouped 
by two-digit NAICS code and average industry size, measured as fraction of value 
added to total. The chart below depicts average fraction of industrially and globally 
diversified firms per industry between 1997 and 2012 and.
104
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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Table XXIII in the Appendix for NAICS code descriptions. 
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The industrial diversification level is not significant, which is not consistent with 
the results of Santalo/Becerra (2008). The global diversification level instead is 
significant, although it yields a discount of 19% for firms that operate in industries with 
a higher level of global diversification. While the industry-level global diversification 
rate yields a discount, the firm-level global coefficient is not significant. This could 
suggest that the discount found for global diversification is not firm-related but 
industry-related instead. 
Table XIII: Fixed effects regression 
Fixed effects regressions of Excess Value on dummy variables denoting industrial and global 
diversification, and a set of control variables Excess value is measured as the logarithm of a 
firm’s Tobin’s q to its imputed q. Imputed segment values are calculated using median Tobin’s 
q values for single-segment domestic firms in the same industry. A firm is industrially 
diversified if it reports more than one industrial business segment. A firm is globally diversified 
if COMPUSTAT’s Geographic Segment File reports more than one geographical segment. 
Regression (1) has been copied from Table X to facilitate comparison. Significance levels are 
reported using three, two, or one asterisk, denoting a level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. 
The White test rejects H0 of homoskedasticity at the 0.01 level for the regression. Therefore, 
reported significance levels are calculated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. 
Independent Variables (1) (12) 
Intercept  0.3533*** 0.4467*** 
 
Diversification-related variables   
Dummy equal to one if only industrially diversified  0.2251*** 0.2338*** 
Dummy equal to one if only globally diversified -0.0667*** -0.0168___ 
Dummy equal to one if both industrially and globally 
diversified 
 0.0921*** 0.1581*** 
Dummy equal to one if year is > 2007 -0.0130___ -0.0192___ 
Dummy equal to one if the diversified firm operates 
only in related industries 
-0.2244*** -0.2216*** 
 
Control variables   
Market value of total capital  0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Long-term debt to total capital -0.7514*** -0.7880*** 
Capital expenditures to sales  0.1766**_ 0.1599**_ 
EBIT to sales  0.2282*** 0.2331*** 
R&D to sales  0.2194*** 0.2435*** 
Advertising to sales  0.7476*** 0.6843*** 
Yearly industry growth rate  -0.5164*** 
Industry size  -0.2394___ 
Industrial diversification level  0.1260___ 
Global diversification level  -0.1944*** 
Adjusted R2 0.0906___ 0.0934___ 
Number of observations 7398___ 7365___ 
6.4. Valuation effects of changes in diversification 
The last test is aimed at assessing how the valuation of diversified firms changes 
as firms increase the amount of segments they operate in. The increasing number of 
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segments should theoretically increase the coordination and communication problems 
and thereby the difficulties related to unrelated diversification; a decreasing value is 
thus expected. Rajan/Servaes/Zingales (2000) argue that adding a new segment to an 
existing business alters its power-structure, thereby also its decision-making process. 
This could impact not only the new segment, but also the efficiency and performance of 
the entire firm.
105
 
Compared to previous studies, which carried out this test on the number of 
industrial segments only, in the present study it was possible to measure it also for 
global diversification. This has been made possible by the introduction of SFAS 131, 
which caused firms to report a greater number of segments for both types of 
diversification.
106
  
Table XIV contains average Tobin’s q values by number of reported firms 
segments and Figure VI depicts excess value by number of segments. From these two 
items, it would appear that company average valuations decrease with the number of 
reported segments.  
These analysis however is not sufficient, as it does not control for other variables. 
In fact, a multivariate regression analysis shows different results: regression (13), 
reported in Table XV, measures the effect of the number of reported segments on excess 
value, instead of a dummy variable like in the previous regressions. While Table XIV 
and Figure VI suggest the contrary, the regression results indicate that firm value 
increases with the number of reported industrial segments, as can be seen from Table 
XV, which reports a positive and significant coefficient (although at the 5% and not at 
the 1% level) for the number of reported industry-segments. Firm value again is 
confirmed to be decreasing with the number of reported geographic segments, as 
predicted by the illustration above. Regression (13) is therefore in line with the results 
of regression (1) and not only shows that the market favours industrial over global 
diversification but also that this remains true for increasing degrees of diversification. 
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Table XIV: Tobin’s q by number of segments 
Mean and median Tobin’s q values by the number of reported 
segments by firms in the COMPUSTAT database. The maximum 
number of industrial segments that can be reported on Compustat 
is ten, while there is no maximum for geographic segments.  
Industrial Geographic 
Segments Mean q Median q   Segments Mean q Median q 
1 1,6412 1,1992   1 1,4310 1,0627 
2 1,2226 1,0101   2 1,5810 1,1725 
3 1,2074 1,0141   3 1,6286 1,2142 
4 1,0103 0,9119   4 1,6500 1,2104 
5 1,0330 0,8777   5 1,6036 1,2088 
6 1,1349 0,9256   6 1,6794 1,2382 
7 1,4820 1,3238   7 1,5858 1,2048 
8 0,9832 0,8668   8 1,4463 1,1616 
9 0,7351 0,7351   9 1,8876 1,2651 
10 0,7287 0,7552   10 1,5773 1,2272 
     >10 1,4902 1,0750 
 
 
 
Figure VI: Excess value by number of reported segments 
Mean excess value by number of reported industrial and geographic 
segments, without controlling for other variables and firm 
characteristics. 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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Table XV: Changes in the degree of diversification 
Ordinary least squares regressions of Excess Value on variables denoting the number of 
reported yearly business segments for each firm, and a set of control variables. Excess value is 
measured as the logarithm of a firm’s Tobin’s q to its imputed q. Imputed segment values are 
calculated using median Tobin’s q values for single-segment domestic firms in the same 
industry. A firm is industrially diversified if it reports more than one industrial business 
segment. A firm is globally diversified if COMPUSTAT’s Geographic Segment File reports 
more than one geographical segment. The sample is based on 32,136 firm-year observations 
over the period 1997–2012. Significance levels are reported using three, two, or one asterisk, 
denoting a level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. Reported significance levels are calculated 
using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Independent Variables (13) 
Intercept 0.4282*** 
 
Diversification-related variables  
Number of yearly industrial segments 0.0407**_ 
Number of yearly global segments -0.0179*** 
Dummy equal to one if the diversified firm operates only in related 
industries 
-0.3296*** 
 
Control variables  
Market value of total capital 0.0000*** 
Long-term debt to total capital -0.7387*** 
Capital expenditures to sales 0.1789**_ 
EBIT to sales 0.2267*** 
R&D to sales 0.2050*** 
Advertising to sales 0.7093*** 
Adjusted R2 0.0863___ 
Number of observations 7,398___ 
 
7. Discussion 
The empirical results that have been presented in the previous chapters introduce a 
few original and interesting ideas about corporate diversification. This study is the first 
to analyse the effects of the financial crisis on the valuation of types of firm 
diversification; the empirical results suggest that investors have become more risk 
averse, as diversified firms seem to be considered a safe option today. 
Other findings, such as the existence of a discount for global diversification 
before the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis, are in line with the those of most 
previous studies. The negative aspects of expanding cross-border seem to outweigh the 
benefits of uncorrelated cash-flows and economies of scale and scope in almost every 
study on global diversification, including the present one. The outcome of a premium 
for industrial diversification, instead, is somehow surprising, as it clearly differs from 
the results of previous studies that employed a similar methodology. The combination 
of industrial and global diversification also appears to be valued favourably by markets. 
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As discussed in section 2.2, however, the accounting reforms introduced in 1997 
significantly improved the quality of available financial information, thereby increasing 
analysts’ forecast efficiency. This should be considered when comparing the results of 
the present thesis with studies using pre-1997 data, such as Denis/Denis/Yost (2002). 
However, as explained in the introductory part of this thesis, these results should 
still be taken carefully when drawing conclusions about the assessment of 
diversification, as a unique and flawless method for measuring the valuation of 
diversified firms does not exist and different authors using different computations have 
obtained contradicting results over the years. 
Additionally, not all robustness test carried out on the regression analysis 
confirmed the primary results of the empirical analysis presented in paragraph 5.2. In 
particular, using total capital to measure excess value instead of Tobin’s q yielded 
almost opposite results. Despite other computations confirming the existence of a 
premium for industrial diversification and a discount for global, this results should still 
be interpreted with this in mind. 
Moreover, the regressions displayed only limited explanatory power, as adjuster 
R-squared ranged between 0.08 and 0.12, depending on the used parameters. While this 
is in line with most previous studies, it is still a relatively low figure to draw confident 
conclusions. 
Overall, the results are still significant and robust to most controlling measures 
and can therefore be considered a valid contribution to the research on corporate 
diversification.  
8. Implications for the accounting practice 
Several reasons can be found to explain why multi-segment firms trade at a 
premium compared to specialised firms. Some of these are closely connected to the 
field of accounting and auditing. For example, diversified and non-diversified firms 
display different behaviour regarding financial disclosures to their investors. It has been 
found that nondisclosure of discretionary data for focused firms is generally related to 
competitive and strategic reasons. Nondisclosure of multi-segment firms, instead, is 
also explained by managerial motives and agency costs.
107
  
                                                 
 
107
 Bens/Berger/Monahan (2011) analysed confidential internal information of several corporations and 
compared it to what the firms chose to public externally. See Bens/Berger/Monahan (2011), p. 447. 
43 
 
In this chapter the empirical results of the thesis will be discussed from an 
accounting point of view. Three main topics will be presented and discussed: earnings 
management, cost of capital and how the recognition of goodwill in M&As can 
influence Tobin’s-q-based measurements of the diversification discount/premium. The 
three topics have been chosen due to their relevance to the mater and to their practical 
implications on the accounting practice or to the research on diversification. 
8.1. Earnings management 
Earnings management is “a strategy used by the management of a company to 
deliberately manipulate the company's earnings so that the figures match a pre-
determined target”. The purpose of earnings management is often that of income 
smoothing, which means that a company tries to reduce the year-over-year volatility of 
earnings by artificially lowering or increasing them according to their reporting 
needs.
108
 Common practices for income smoothing are advancing or postponing 
expenses (in quarterly or annual statements), pulling back the following year's sales, 
adding overtime hours at the end of the year, selling excess assets, late recording of 
supplies, prepaying of expenses, writing off of valuable inventory, writing up 
previously written-off inventory or postponing the payment of invoices.
109
 
Income smoothing affects the market value of firms, as those with a high level of 
discretionary current accruals (DCA) are characterised by a significantly lower average 
market value compared to firms with moderate or low level of DCA. Additionally, these 
firms are significantly mispriced by investors and therefore trade at a discount 
compared to firms with low level of DCA.
110
 Earnings management is also strongly 
associated with forced CEO turnover while not related to voluntary turnover, 
corroborating the fact that investors consider these practices with disfavour.
111
 
Jiraporn/Kim/Mathur (2008) found that a firm’s degree of industrial 
diversification mitigates earnings management by 1.8% and that the combination of 
global and industrial diversification mitigates it by 2.5%. Global diversification on its 
own, instead, has not been found to affect earnings management in any way. This can 
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be explained by the fact that diversified firms present non-perfectly correlated cash 
flows from diverse sources. The accruals generated from these cash flows will therefore 
tend to cancel each other out, making it more difficult to adapt the overall earnings to 
the desired target. They also found that focused firms suffer from a higher degree of 
information asymmetry, a common characteristic of diversifying firms that makes it 
more difficult for investors to monitor managers’ actions, including earnings 
management.
112
  
Figure VII: Market value of firms with earnings management 
The first chart depicts a three portfolios of firms formed according to their level of 
discretionary current accruals (DCA), a proxy for earnings quality. DCA equals the 
difference between the total current accruals (TCA) and non-discretionary current 
accruals (NDCA). The second chart displays how analysts’ forecast errors are 
significantly higher for firms with a high level of negative accruals. The third chart 
displays the average market value of the three portfolios. 
           
 
Source: Kwag/Stephens (2010), p. 48 
 
El Mehdi/Seboui (2011)’s study finds a significant correlation between earnings 
management and industrial diversification. This however, does not apply for geographic 
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diversification, also not when it goes together with industrial. According to their study, 
multinationals tend to display a significantly higher degree of earnings management 
than purely domestic firms. This is consistent with the empirical results of this thesis 
and with the agency conflicts hypothesis, which states that a higher degree of global 
diversification generates information asymmetry and therefore facilitates earnings 
management.
113
 
Overall, earnings management (among other types of agency costs) could be a 
very significant for explaining the finding of a diversification discount. If this adverse 
phenomenon could be reduced (for example through stronger enforcement) it could be 
argued that also diversification would be seen less negatively; and thus also the 
valuation discount for globally diversified firms could decrease or even turn into a 
premium. 
8.2. Cost of capital 
In a perfectly competitive market, with no taxes and transaction costs, firm 
diversification should have no positive impact on firm value beyond potential synergies; 
risk reduction could therefore be obtained more efficiently by investors, by purchasing a 
portfolio of diversified stock.
114
 
Empirical research, however, has shown that one of the principal benefits of firm 
diversification is its risk-reducing effect, obtained from the non-perfect correlation of 
cash flows from different business units. This generates a coinsurance effect and lowers 
earnings variability and the firm’s default risk, thereby reducing also the firm’s risk 
premium.
115
 Hann/Ogneva/Ozbas (2012) find that firms that diversify into unrelated 
industries report a significantly lower average cost of capital than comparable portfolios 
of stand-alone firms. This is explainable by the lower volatility of their cash flows and 
the lower perceived risk of uncorrelated businesses. They also find that diversification 
lowers firms’ systematic risk, as it reduces some of the countercyclical deadweight 
loss.
116
 
Stulz (1999) finds that globalised firms that have access to capital markets from 
many countries benefit from reduced market risk premia and therefore have lower cost 
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of capital. He also argues that a “global CAPM model” should be used for 
multinationals, as they are less subject to the volatility of the local market.
117
 
 Lee/Kwok (1988) created an analytical framework to analyse the determinants 
of MNCs capital structures and listed several reasons to explain why they differ from 
those of domestic companies. These include, for example, environmental reasons such 
as political risk, greater complexity of cross-border operations, dealing with market 
imperfections and foreign exchange risk. These environmental factors affect the firm’s 
capital structure determinants, which thus cause the difference between MNCs and 
domestic firms. Their empirical analysis confirms that MNCs have higher agency costs 
and are less leveraged than domestic firms, while they cannot find any supporting 
evidence about their bankruptcy costs hypothesis.
118
 
Figure VIII: Capital structure determinants 
This chart depicts an analytical framework to analyse the determinants of 
MNCs’ the capital structures compared to those of domestics firms. 
Empirical evidence, however, contradicts the hypothesis of lower 
bankruptcy costs for MNCs when controlling for size.  
 
Source: Lee/Kwok (1988), p. 200 
 
Greater cost of capital due to increased operating risk is therefore also a reason 
that explains the existence of a valuation discount for globally diversified firms. The 
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empirical results of this thesis, however, suggest that the risk perception of global 
MNCs might have changed during the recent global crisis. This could bring down the 
financing costs of multinationals, as the capital markets now perceive them to be safer 
as their domestic counterparts. 
8.3. Goodwill and Tobin’s q 
One of the most commonly used measures used by researchers to compare the 
value of diversified and non-diversified firms is Tobin’s q. Custódio et al. (2013) argue, 
however, that this ratio might be skewed for firms that are very acquisitive and that this 
might be a reason for explaining the finding of a diversification discount. They find that 
multi-segment firms engage, on average, in significantly more M&A activities than 
their single-segment counterparts.
119
  
Amit/Livnat/Zarowin (1991) also find that diversified firms are more acquisitive 
than focused firms and that this leads to a reduction of their book-to-market ratio.
120
 
This can be explained by the different treatment of internally- and externally-generated 
goodwill under US GAAP: while internally generated goodwill is not identifiable and 
has to be recognised as an expense, the excess of the cost of an acquisition price over 
the fair value of acquired net assets can be capitalised as goodwill on the acquirer’s 
balance sheet.
121
 
Custódio et al. (2013) argue that this different treatment has an impact on Tobin’s 
q because diversified firms display a significantly higher amount of capitalised goodwill 
than their non-diversified counterparts. Since post-acquisition balance sheets will 
generally be closer to market value than the sum of pre-acquisition balance sheets, this 
has a negative impact on Tobin’s q and could explain the finding of a diversification 
discount in studies that use this measure. Custódio et al. (2013), in fact, find that the 
industrial diversification discount disappears when controlling for goodwill and for the 
number of acquisitions made by diversifying firms.
122
 
The empirical results of this thesis, however, suggest that there is a premium for 
industrial diversification and a discount only for global diversification. Table XVI 
reports statistics about average goodwill and number of acquisitions of firms in the 
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analysed sample. It can be seen that diversified firms are indeed more acquisitive and 
that they recognise, on average, more goodwill than single-segment domestic firms. 
Their goodwill-to-assets ratio is also significantly higher. Globally diversified firms 
display similar characteristics compared to single-segment domestic firms. They are 
however not more acquisitive than industrially diversified ones and their goodwill is 
also not higher. If we assume that the recognition of goodwill decreases q-values for 
diversified firms, and use this hypothesis to explain the finding of a discount for 
globally diversified firms, we must also assume that the premium found in the empirical 
analysis of this thesis is understated and that industrially diversified firms enjoy an even 
greater premium, which seems unrealistic. Further investigation on this topic would be 
needed, but this goes beyond scope of the present thesis. These findings should however 
be kept in mind when interpreting empirical results about corporate diversification, 
because they should make us question the validity of the results of several studies. 
Table XVI: Goodwill comparison 
Comparison of the average amount of goodwill recognised by firms, divided 
by their type of diversification strategy. Average number of acquired firms and 
the average recognised goodwill through acquisitions are also reported. The 
last column contains average goodwill-to-asset ratios, with significance levels 
for the difference between diversified firms and single-segment domestic 
firms). Significance levels are reported using three, two, or one asterisk, 
denoting a level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. 
 
Number of 
Acquisitions Goodwill 
Acquired 
Goodwill 
Goodwill/ 
Total Assets 
Single-segment domestic  28.4 106.7 125.2 0.0868___ 
Only Industrially diversified 83.2 423.2 222.3 0.1154*** 
Only Globally diversified 61.7 334.6 215.6 0.1139*** 
Multi-segment 
Multinational 
188.2 1129.6 497.0 0.1417*** 
 
9. Implications for international business 
This final chapter’s aim is to analyse and discuss the empirical results of this 
thesis from an International Business point of view (IB). A literature-based introduction 
on the topic of cross-border firm operations gives a general explanation of the principal 
theories that describe why firms operate internationally and why MNCs exist; these are 
summarised in Table XVII. In paragraph 9.2 different internationalisation strategies for 
diversified firms are discussed and the empirical results of chapter 5 are interpreted 
from the IB perspective in paragraph 9.3. 
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9.1. Introducing literature 
The connection between the valuation of corporate diversification and the field of 
international business and MNCs is very significant and of great interest. MNCs have 
already been studied from many points of view and by numerous researchers, starting 
from Ricardo’s comparative advantage theory and arriving to the later process/stage, 
imperfect markets, transaction cost and capabilities theories.
123
 The valuation effects of 
diversification, global in particular, have however never been analysed very thoroughly. 
Historically, research has focused on why firms choose to internationalise in the first 
place, rather than examining their market valuation compared to non-internationalising 
firms. 
In 1937 Ronald Coase explained how market imperfections will push a firm to 
internalise those operations that it can carry out more efficiently and at a lower cost than 
the external market. He argued that market imperfections are actually the primary 
reason for the existence of corporations.
124
 
In 1960 Stephen Hymer tries to explain FDI using the competitive advantage and 
market imperfections model. He stated that domestic firms should, ceteris paribus, have 
an advantage over foreign firms in the form of knowledge and expertise of local laws, 
customs, politics, language, restrictive government policies toward foreign firms, 
exchange rates and lower risk. Foreign firms that enter the market must therefore 
possess a competitive advantage over local firms in order to be able to compete. These 
could be, for instance, economies of scale, market power, marketing skills, R&D 
capabilities, brand name, superior technologies or cheaper financing possibilities. FDI 
therefore occurs in countries where there is a higher degree of market imperfections.
125
 
Vernon (1966) argues that internationalisation occurs naturally as part of a 
product’s life cycle as firms expand to seek economies of scale. The internationalisation 
process is gradual and starts from export, which requires the lowest commitment and 
generates the lowest risk; FDI occurs only at a later stage, since it is the strongest form 
of internationalisation and requires the highest commitment. 
Kindleberger (1969) applies Coase’s market imperfections and transactions cost 
theories to internationalisation. He argues that the existence of a multinational 
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enterprise can be justified by market imperfections, which push firms to internalise 
operations that would otherwise be carried out by the market.
 126
 MNCs therefore exist 
when it is more efficient to perform a cross-border operation within a company, rather 
than exchanging goods or services cross-border through import/export operations 
between different firms. In perfectly competitive markets, MNCs would therefore not 
exist, as they have a natural disadvantage over local corporations. 
127
 
Buckley/Casson (1976) list several reasons for internalising foreign operations, 
which can be industry-specific, region-specific, nation-specific or firm-specific. 
Internalisation allows MNCs to avoid costly and risky arm’s-length operations, 
transactions involving intangible (and inseparable) assets (e.g., brand image), tariffs and 
barriers to entry, additional costs for communication and uncertainty due to 
unfamiliarity with the foreign market. They also argue that MNCs will grow only as 
long as the benefits are not outweighed by the costs of communication, coordination 
and control that bigger international firms will inevitably incur into.
128
 
Dunning (1981) explained firms’ internationalisation policies with his famous 
OLI paradigm. He described the three types of advantages that internationalising firms 
have. These are ownership-specific advantages, which are those directly related to the 
company (i.e. specific features that distinguish it from competitors, such as resources or 
knowledge); location-specific advantages, such as factors of production, market size, 
infrastructure, laws and cultural advantages (i.e. psychic distance); and internalisation-
specific advantages, which are the reason why a multinational is more efficient than the 
external market (market imperfections).
129
 
Starting from the beginning of the 1990s, the perspective started shifting from the 
broader market view to the more specific firm view. Research focused on the so-called 
Resource Based View (RBV), which explained how firms internationalise based on 
their unique resources and on their ability to create value in foreign countries.
130
 This 
view, however, assumed that firms would always start their operations in their home 
country and then internationalise at a later stage. This cannot adequately explain the 
modern phenomenon of born globals, which are firms that sell on international markets 
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from the beginning of their operations. This has been possible in recent years through 
changing consumer preferences (specialised and customised products in niche markets), 
changing technologies that allow small firms to compete on cost and quality with bigger 
MNCs, cheaper telecommunication systems that allow smaller enterprises to manage 
global businesses, shrinking product life cycles that make small companies more 
adaptable and cost effective, more readily available information on export markets (i.e. 
on the internet) and lowered storage and retrieval costs.
131
 
Table XVII: Overview of principal IB theories 
Year Author(s) Theory Principal findings 
1937 Coase Market imperfections Firms exist and need to internalise certain 
operations because of market failures 
1960 Hymer 
Competitive advantage 
and market 
imperfections 
Domestic firms have an intrinsic 
advantage over foreign firms. These must 
gave a competitive advantage over foreign 
firms in order to compete. FDI occurs 
with high degree of market imperfection. 
1966 Vernon 
International product life 
cycle 
Internationalisation occurs as a natural 
step in the life cycle of a product, which is 
extended internationally for firms that 
seek economies of scale 
1969 Kindleberger 
Competitive advantage 
and market 
imperfections 
MNCs exist because they are able to 
perform certain cross-border operations 
more efficiently than the market  
1976 
Buckley and 
Casson 
Internationalisation 
theory 
Internalisation allows MNCs to avoid 
costly arm’s-length operations that may 
be costly and risky 
1981 Dunning Eclectic paradigm 
Three types of advantages push firms to 
internationalise (Ownership, Location and 
Internalisation). 
 
9.2. Diversification and internationalisation strategies 
There are several paths a firm can take when it decides to internationalise its 
operations. Firms might not necessarily adopt their home-country strategy when going 
cross-border; for instance, a single-segment firm might enter a new country by 
diversifying its business; diversified firms, on the contrary, could opt to focus on only 
one of their segments in a foreign country. Figure IX illustrates the different strategies a 
firm can choose when growing its business, nationally or internationally. According to 
Simmonds (1990), the most common diversified strategy towards the end of the 1970s 
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and beginning of the 1980s was the related-internal approach, which mean that firms 
expanded their business by growing through internal development into related 
industries. The least common strategy in those years was the unrelated-internal 
approach (i.e. expanding into unrelated industries using only internal capabilities). The 
related-internal was also found to be the most profitable strategy, while the unrelated-
external (i.e. expansion to unrelated industries through acquisition) was the worst-
performing, although the differences were not highly significant.
132
 
Figure IX: Strategies for firm growth according to Simmonds (1990) 
 
Source: Simmonds (1990), p. 400 
 
Many firms, however, internationalise their business in two steps: first they start 
exporting their products into the target country, and only in a second stage, after they 
became more familiar with the new environment, they opt for foreign direct investment 
(FDI). These strategies are common for both SMEs (small and medium enterprises) and 
bigger MNCs. The principal reason for internationalising (for both types of firms) is 
commonly to extend their business abroad in order to seek additional growth when their 
home market is saturating. This need therefore occurs at a different stage for firms that 
start operating in small or in bigger countries.
133
  
Cavusgil/Bilkey/Tesar (1979) find that the most frequently observed 
characteristics of US-based exporting firms are annual sales of over 1 million dollars 
and having managers with very favourable expectations regarding the effect of 
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internationalisation on firm growth and market development. In fact, 96.4% of firms 
with these characteristics are actually exporters.
134
 
Lu/Beamish (2001) find a U-curved relationship between the level of FDI of 
SMEs and their performance, which is negatively related to the level of export sales and 
improves with a greater extent of FDI. The initial decline is related to liability of 
foreignness, which needs to be overcome by the firm by developing new knowledge and 
capabilities that are specific to the foreign market; these should allow the firm to 
outperform its local competitors. They also found a negative relation between firm size 
and performance and product diversification and performance for firms in Japan.
135
 
In a following paper they modified their U-shape theory growth into an S-shape, 
arguing that internationalising firms will grow only up to the point where the benefits of 
internationalisation are offset by the costs of managing many subsidiaries in different 
markets.
136
 This can be seen by the graphical representation of Figure X. The authors 
argue that, after the initial loss, the total benefits of diversification will overtake the 
total costs (point A), up to the point where the coordination costs will revert this trend 
back to a loss (point B). 
A firm’s chosen entry mode in a host country has also been proven to be very 
important for the success of the internationalisation strategy. Post-entry performance 
has been found to be related not only to whether the firm entered greenfield or by 
acquisition, but also on the combination of this choice and pre-entry industry factors of 
the home country.
137
 
Hitt/Hoskisson/Kim (1997) discovered a strong correlation between firm 
performance and the combination of industrial and global diversification. As can be 
seen in Figure XI, the combination of industrial and global diversification yields higher 
returns than non-diversifying firms for higher degrees of both global and industrial 
diversification. Focused firms outperform all the others with absence or at low degrees 
of global diversification.
138
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Figure X: The phases of internationalisation 
Graphical illustration of the nonlinear relationship between international expansion and 
firm performance. The three phases of international expansion are characterised by 
liability of newness and foreignness (phase 1), increasing levels of geographic scope 
and growth of the firm’s profitability (phase 2), escalation of governance and 
coordination costs to the point where they surpass the benefits of geographic 
diversification (phase 3). 
 
Source: Adapted from Lu/Beamish (2004), p. 600 
 
Amit/Livnat/Zarowin (1989) find that diversified firms are more acquisitive than 
non-diversified firms when entering a new country and that this is not mitigated by a 
high ownership-concentration. They also find that the international expansion mode 
remains fairly constant over time (i.e. acquisitive firms tend to keep expanding by 
acquisition, whereas internally growing firms keep investing in internal ventures.
139
 
Firms that adopt a mixed approach to internationalisation (acquisition or greenfield) 
according to the occasion, however, are not found to be performing worse than those 
that keep the same approach in every country.
140
 
Mudambi/Mudambi (2002) also find that diversified firms are more likely to 
enter a new country through acquisition and that diversifying entry strategies are 
commonly associated with low growth in the host country’s industry equivalent to 
their core business at home. International product diversification is also associated 
with greater international experience.
141
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Figure XI: Interaction effects of global and industrial diversification on ROA 
Interaction effects of product and international diversification on return on 
assets (ROA). Non-diversifiers consist of single-business firms; moderate 
diversifiers consist of firms whose product diversification scores are lower 
than .813; and high diversifiers consist of firms whose product diversification 
scores are .813 or higher.
142
 
 
Source: Hitt/Hoskisson/Kim (1997), p. 787 
 
According to Chatterjee (1990) entry by acquisition is more likely in concentrated 
markets and for firms with higher stock prices. His results also indicate that, as 
predictable, firms with greater internal funds and low debt ratios are more likely to enter 
a new market greenfield, which is also more frequent for expansion into related 
industries. 
Busija/O’Neill/Zeithaml (1997) analyse the relation between type of 
diversification (related, unrelated or mixed) on the foreign country entry mode and 
discover that, while there is no clear link between type of diversification and entry 
mode, the combination of entry mode and diversification strategy is related to the firm’s 
subsequent profitability.
143
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Ruiz-Moreno/Mas-Ruiz/Nicolau-Gonzálbez (2007) find that a firm’s entry mode 
in foreign countries (i.e. greenfield vs. acquisition) strongly depends on the cultural 
distance to the host country and to the firm’s size but not to its international experience 
or its host-country experience.
144
 US-based firms, for instance, tend to keep lower 
equity stakes in firms that operate in countries with a high cultural distance compared to 
firms of other developed countries. The higher ownership concentration and the 
managerial compensation schemes in the US can explain this greater risk aversion. 
Lower equity stakes are also found to be associated with a greater need for learning 
when entering a new country.
145
 
Overall, it is clear that the type of diversification a firm chooses is very important 
for its international expansion strategy. The relation between industrial and global 
diversification and the internationalisation strategy is not only relevant for managerial 
decision making, but should be subject to further investigation in relation to the 
valuation of corporate diversification. 
9.3. Interpretation of empirical results 
The empirical results that have been presented in chapters 5 and 6 suggest that 
multi-segment firms are viewed more favourably by investors than their specialised 
counterparts. Multinationals, instead, traded at a discount compared to non-
internationalising companies in the years that preceded the financial crisis that started in 
2008. These results could be partially explained by the negative correlation found 
between earnings management and industrial diversification and the combination of 
industrial and global diversification, as explained in paragraph 8.1.
146
 This is consistent 
with the results presented in Table X, as the combination of industrial and global 
diversification results in a valuation premium, which would support previous research 
that found that MNCs are generally valued favourably by financial markets.
147
  
The discount found for global diversification can be explained by the agency-
costs of expansion. As a firm expands internationally, it becomes more difficult for 
investors to monitor managers’ operations. This could lead to empire-building, which is 
characterised by increased sales growth accompanied by a decreasing profit margin, 
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thus reducing firm value.
148
 Investors propensity for investing into globalising firms is 
also reduced by home-equity bias, which describes the tendency of purchasing stock of 
companies of your own country, for which information is more readily available. The 
lack of information about cross-border operations could therefore explain the risk-
perception that disadvantages MNCs.
149
 
After 2007, however, as the financial crisis increased investors’ risk-aversion, the 
higher degree of global diversification could have become more attractive, since it made 
firms less susceptible to internal market fluctuations. This trend would indicate a return 
to seek out MNCs as surrogate vehicles for global diversification, after the development 
of new financial instruments in the 1970s made it possible to achieve this through 
internationally diversified stock portfolios.
150
 
Geringer/Beamish/DaCosta (1989) find that there is a curvilinear relationship 
between the degree of global diversification and firm performance, measured as profit-
to-sales and profit-to-assets; the relationship begins positive and becomes negative as 
the degree of diversification increases.
 151
 The empirical results of this thesis, however, 
suggest that the discount starts already at two reported global segments. While less than 
20% of US-firms are globally diversified, almost 70% of those who are operate in more 
than one foreign country, as can be seen on Figure XII. The same is not true for 
industrial diversification, as only 32% of diversified firms report sales in more than two 
segments. 
Hitt/Hoskisson/Kim (1997) also find a curvilinear relationship between global 
diversification and performance. Additionally they find that the combination of global 
and industrial diversification has a positive effect on performance. This finding again is 
consistent with the results of this thesis. They argue that, at some point, the costs of 
global diversification start exceeding the benefits, causing diminishing marginal 
returns.
152
 
An additional issue that has to be kept in mind is that, for practical reasons, all the 
research on corporate diversification does not distinguish between the ways MNCs 
operate internationally. Some authors have taken into account the differences between 
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related and unrelated diversification, but this is a very strong simplification. For 
example, according to Perlmutter (1969) international orientation can be distinguished 
between ethnocentric, polycentric and geocentric. Ethnocentric firms are home-country 
oriented, keep the all the authority and decision power in their headquarters, and apply 
the same operational standards in every country they operate in. This strategy works 
well for standardised products that need little adaptation in new markets, but can lead to 
disastrous failures if adopted by the wrong company. Polycentric firms are host-country 
oriented and adapt their operations very strongly to the local environment. They usually 
also reinvest the profits in the country they were generated in. Geocentric firms employ 
a mixed approach. They are able to find some optimal standards that can be applied to 
every country, which gives them competitive advantage over competitors. At the same 
time they are able to adapt their operations to local conditions.
153
 
Figure XII: Distribution of reported segments 
Distribution of global and industrial segments reported by firms in the United States 
as a percentage of total firm-years. The percentage of firms reporting more than 10 
global segments is 1%, while 10 is the maximum of industrial segments that can be 
reported. 
 
Source: own illustration 
 
Perlmutter’s classification was the first and most famous, but several others 
followed later on. This should make it clear how there are several different ways of 
diversifying internationally and that valuation differences might not be peculiar to all 
types of diversification. An empirical analysis on this statement is however very 
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complex, as firms do not define or disclose their type of international operations mode. 
These distinctions, however, need to be kept in mind when analysing results about the 
valuation of global diversification. 
Summing up, the results of this thesis’ empirical research, combined with past 
results on the topic, would suggest that the market favours multi-segment MNCs 
because of their internal efficiency and greater performance. Additionally, it has been 
found that in critical market conditions, such as a financial crisis, single-segment global 
firms are not perceived as unfavourably as during normal market conditions, possibly 
due to the risk-reducing effects of diversification. 
10. Conclusion 
The aim of this master’s thesis was to assess if the market value of diversified 
firms significantly differs from that of focused firms, not only on an industrial but also 
on a global level, distinguishing between related and unrelated diversification and 
examining the different effects of the diversification types. The first part of the thesis 
offered an in-depth overview of the extensive literature on the topic, starting from the 
studies of the early 1990s, which claimed that diversified firms are value-destroying, 
and going to the most recent studies, which questioned the methodology of older studies 
and, in some cases, found that diversified firms can trade at a premium. 
The different methodological approaches that have been used in the past to 
measure the premium/discount of diversified firms, based on which the method of this 
thesis has been built and developed on, have also been presented. Several theoretical 
reasons for the existence of multi-segment and multinational firms have been illustrated 
and numerous reasons to justify the discount or premium have been examined, 
explaining why corporate diversification is still a very actual and relevant topic, both for 
the academic and the corporate fields.  
It has also been argued why the financial crisis is a relevant topic regarding 
corporate diversification, despite the current deficiency of relevant research on the 
valuation effects of different types of diversification during the crisis; it has been 
illustrated how the financial and economic events could have impacted multibusiness 
and multi-segment firms and their value.  
The empirical results presented throughout chapters 5 to 7 point out that, between 
1997 and 2012, industrially diversified firms have been trading at a premium of 22.5% 
compared to focused firms, while globally diversified firms have not. The combination 
of industrial and global diversification has been found to yield an additional premium of 
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9.2%. This positive effect is even stronger for firms that diversified into unrelated 
industries after the crisis, since firms that operate in related industries only have been 
found to be trading at a 27% discount compared to firms that operate also in unrelated 
industries. It has also been discovered that the premium for industrial diversification 
increases with the number of segments a firm reports to be operating in. This, however, 
is true only for industrial diversification, because the opposite effect can be observed for 
the number of reported global segments. 
The impact of the financial crisis has been that of increasing the premium for 
industrial diversification and eliminating the discount for global diversification after 
2008. The discount for related diversification also appears significant only after 2008. 
These results suggest that the crisis may have increased investors’ risk awareness, who 
therefore seem to prefer safer investments into firms that benefit from non-perfectly 
correlated and less volatile cash flow streams, compared to the greater returns of 
focused firms, which are more subject to the unsystematic risk of their industry and 
country. 
Overall, however, there is no univocal valuation of diversification, as the value of 
diversified firms depends on the type of strategy they have chosen. It appears, however, 
that the valuation of all types of diversification has improved during the financial crisis 
(i.e. more positive or less negative). 
The empirical findings have also been interpreted from an accounting perspective 
in chapter 8. It has been discussed how earnings management can explain the existence 
of a diversification discount, especially for cross-border diversification, where managers 
have greater leeway and greater possibility of hiding information from investors. On the 
other hand, it has been considered how industrially diversified firms benefit from lower 
average cost of capital, due to the risk-reducing effect of their diversified cash flow 
streams. This has been used as an argument in favour of the existence of a 
diversification premium (which has not been found for global diversification). It has 
also been illustrated how diversified firms have a greater propensity towards expansion 
through acquisition and how this could help explaining the discount found by studies 
using Tobin’s q as a measurement for comparing firm value. 
Chapter 9 adds additional insights from a strategic and international business 
point of view. The different theories explaining the reasons for internationalisation have 
been presented and discussed, from Coase’s market imperfection theory to Buckley and 
Casson’s internationalisation theory and Dunning’s eclectic paradigm. The relation 
between diversification and market entry mode has been described and it has been 
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emphasised how the different combinations of diversification strategies and host-
country entry modes are significant for a firm’s internationalisation approach. 
While this thesis does not have the ambition to offer the ultimate answer to the 
valuation effects of corporate diversification, it has demonstrated that this strategy can 
be beneficial in certain circumstances and in determined economic conditions. The 
widespread adoption of a diversified expansion strategy among US firms and the 
growing fraction of diversified firms over the recent years emphasises the importance of 
this phenomenon. Since previous research found different performance for different 
international expansion modes, additional research is needed to further examine how 
internationalisation strategies affect the valuation of globally diversified firms. 
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11. Appendix 
A1) 
Table XVIII: Excess value using difference and averages 
Sample of 32,136 Firm-Years between 1997 and 2012. Excess Value 1 has been 
calculated as                            using average single-segment values 
 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
Domestic Only 
Single Segment 14171 -0.0049 1.2012 
Multi-segment 2060  0.2122*** 0.7202 
Multinational 
Single Segment 11997 -0.1188*** 1.4082 
Multi-segment 3908  0.0822*** 0.9154 
 
Table XIX: Excess using logarithm and averages 
Sample of 32,136 Firm-Years between 1997 and 2012. Excess Value 1 has been 
calculated as   (
                
          
) using average single-segment values 
 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
Domestic Only 
Single Segment 14171 -0.1385*** 0.5179 
Multi-segment 2060 0.2345*** 0.5921 
Multinational 
Single Segment 11997 -0.1646*** 0.5939 
Multi-segment 3908 0.1659*** 0.6691 
 
Table XX: Excess value using difference and medians 
Sample of 32,136 Firm-Years between 1997 and 2012. Excess Value 1 has been 
calculated as                            using median single-segment values 
 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
Domestic Only 
Single Segment 14171 0.2249*** 1.2772 
Multi-segment 2060 0.3604*** 0.6703 
Multinational 
Single Segment 11997 0.1889*** 1.3757 
Multi-segment 3908 0.2832*** 0.8225 
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A3) 
Table XXIII: NAICS Codes 
Code Industry Title 
11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 
21 Mining 
22 Utilities 
23 Construction 
31-33 Manufacturing 
42 Wholesale Trade 
44-45 Retail Trade 
48-49 Transportation and Warehousing 
51 Information 
52 Finance and Insurance 
53 Real Estate Rental and Leasing 
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises 
56 Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services 
61 Educational Services 
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 
72 Accommodation and Food Services 
81 Other Services (except Public Administration) 
92 Public Administration 
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